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Abstract
The reduction of surface water flows by adjacent groundwater pumping is an externality
caused by agricultural producers. Previous studies have analyzed management policies for
such externalities, but these have assumed that the ability to monitor stream depletion is
perfect and the ability to regulate it is continuous. In practice, the ability to monitor either
stream depletion or groundwater pumping is limited as it is often politically or financially
infeasible to do so. Consequently, real-world management strategies result in reductions in
farm size rather than in groundwater pumping, an adjustment at the extensive rather than
the intensive margin.
To reflect real-world conditions, I consider alternative policies when the ability to monitor
is imperfect. The purpose of this analysis is to understand the relative performance of tax,
zoning, and trading policies to meet reductions in stream depletion in terms of aggregate costs
and changes in industry size. To accomplish this, I develop a microparameter model that
considers policies based on easily observable field characteristics, and make a methodological
contribution by introducing tradable permit systems into the microparameter framework.
Using a Monte Carlo simulation, I derive general results regarding aggregate abatement,
industry size, and costs. I then apply this model to a specific case study of a resource
district in western Nebraska. Results show that the welfare loss of imperfect monitoring of
groundwater pumping may be small. The relative cost-savings of alternative policies depend
largely on the joint distribution of field profitability and marginal damage, but the ranking
of policies in terms of cost-effectiveness is fairly robust.
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To my mother, whose love for her children embodies the movement for environmental
protection.
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Introduction and Motivation
Groundwater is an important and reliable source of water for municipal supply, industrial
use, and irrigated agriculture. However, the overuse of groundwater can result in increas-
ing pumping costs and shrinking availability of the resource for future generations, as has
been the case recently in northwestern Kansas [1]. In other circumstances, groundwater
pumping decreases nearby surface water flows, a process known as stream depletion. This
outcome affects and inhibits other uses of surface water resources, including several sectors of
the economy, recreation, and aquatic ecosystems. In many cases nationally and worldwide,
stream depletion has pitted interest groups against one another in fights over water rights.
Climatic variability and population growth have exacerbated these problems, and growing
concern for protecting aquatic habitats has been another impetus for the conjunctive man-
agement of groundwater and surface water. Interstate litigation reached the Supreme Court
regarding such apportionments [2], and more regionally, authorities have taken actions, of-
ten controversial, to curb groundwater use for the protection of state- or federally-protected
species [3]. These conflicts may even rise to an international level in the near future as
understanding of groundwater movement and usage improves [4], [5].
Groundwater management is emerging rapidly in response to these conflicts and has been
the topic of many hydrologic and economic studies. It is now well known that many aquifers
are hydrologically connected to surface water, and the relationships describing their inter-
actions are improving. Hydrologic science relates a groundwater user’s effect on stream
depletion; this effect varies through space, dependent on characteristics such as its extrac-
tion rate, its distance from the stream, and its surrounding aquifer properties. As such,
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stream depletion by groundwater pumping is a spatially heterogeneous externality.
However, metering of groundwater extraction in the United States and worldwide is fairly
uncommon, making regulatory action challenging. Work to date in the environmental eco-
nomics literature has explored such problems, called nonpoint source pollution, in which
monitoring the direct damage by heterogeneous users is cost prohibitive [6]. Because of this,
first-best solutions are often infeasible and regulators are then faced with applying uniform
standards. These second-best alternatives may lose efficiency and an important question is
by how much, which depends largely on the policy choice and application [7], [8]. There
are circumstances under which uniformly applied policies may approximate spatially differ-
entiated policies [7]. Other studies have explored empirically which behavioral or physical
proxies approximate first-best solutions [9], [10]. Still, many of these proxies may not be
readily observable to the regulator.
When groundwater extraction is not metered, regulators have imperfect information and
are limited from using policies that directly target its use. In these cases, management
strategies may be discrete rather than continuous. Of the large body of literature on point
source and nonpoint source pollution management, the subset of relevant groundwater man-
agement literature has assumed that the ability to monitor is perfect and thus the ability to
regulate continuous, allowing for spatially targeted policies of groundwater extraction [11],
[12], [13], [14]. While perfect monitoring may exist in special circumstances, this is not
generally reflective of policies for managing groundwater. As such, the insights gained from
this literature, based on continuous regulation, may not be transferable to cases of imperfect
information.
Other approaches have more accurately captured the discrete nature of regulations con-
structed under imperfect monitoring. These are typically referred to as “microparameter”
or “putty-clay” models. Still, these analyses compare policies that rely on information that
few, if any, regulators possess, such as ambient pollution, input use, and productive output
[15], [16], [17]. In the case of groundwater management, stream depletion, groundwater
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use, and profitability are typically unknown; the lack of this knowledge drives discontinuous
regulations such as flat taxes and water retirements. Seemingly, there is a gap in the litera-
ture that addresses management in cases with both discontinuous regulations and imperfect
monitoring.
In this thesis, I address this gap by comparing alternative policies that are based on more
readily observable characteristics. These policies both accurately reflect the regulations for
groundwater seen in practice and are readily implementable for regulators with imperfect
monitoring. I am interested in finding which of these are most cost-effective, how they affect
the industry’s size, and the factors driving those results. Further, I explore whether evi-
dence exists that imperfect monitoring leads to significant welfare loss in the case of stream
depletion.
The findings presented here show that most of the environmental and economic outcomes
of a first-best tax policy, with perfect monitoring, can be achieved with instruments with im-
perfect monitoring. Further, the magnitude of cost-savings between policies depends largely
on firm characteristics, but the relative ranking of policies is much less sensitive to these.
The robustness of policy rankings makes it so the choice of policy instrument is unaffected
by uncertainty of firm characteristics.
This thesis is presented as follows: in the following section, I present a model of a reg-
ulatory environment with imperfect monitoring and discrete choices. I then describe the
empirical application of this model to a resources district in western Nebraska, along with
the data that enables me to test it. To gain a general understanding of the model, I first
compare policy instruments by conducting a Monte Carlo simulation that draws randomly
from prescribed distributions. I then simulate this comparison for the empirical application.
I discuss emergent patterns of these simulations and finish with concluding remarks and
suggestions for future analyses.
3
Model
Here we consider a production unit whose technology and local parameters are fixed, cap-
tured by vector θ. The production function then has a fixed proportions relationship to the
input and corresponding output, consistent with the findings of Berck and Hefland [18] and
Paris [19]. The production unit if operated imposes a damaging externality, d, which is also
generated proportionately to the input, also supported by studies developed by Hochman
and Zilberman [15], Moffitt et al. [16], and Green and Sunding [17]. The nature of these fixed
proportions relationships are captured by what are called “microparameter” or “putty-clay”
models.
The production unit i decides whether to operate using the damaging input or not. If it
chooses to operate with it, its decision is:
max
j, wj
pj · yj(wj, θi)− c(θi) · wj − Fj(θi) = piwi (2.1)
where j is a good that may be produced by the unit, wj is the input to produce it, pj is the
price of the good, yj is the output, θi is unit i’s specific local parameters, c is the per-unit
cost of utilizing input w, and Fj is the fixed cost of production. From this, the unit chooses
the most profitable good m it may produce with optimal, unconstrained input use w∗m. I
call this piwi , the profit-maximizing choice using input w, which has constant returns to scale.
If the production unit decides not to operate using input w, then it may produce another
good, k:
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max
k
pk · yk(θi)− Fk(θi) = pi0i (2.2)
from which it selects the profit-maximizing choice to produce good n with pi0i profits of con-
stant returns to scale. Now the unit makes the profit-maximizing choice between producing
good m with input w∗m and good n:
pi∗i = Ai ·max (pm · ym(w∗m, θi)− c(θi) · w∗m − Fm(θi), pn · yn(θi)− Fn(θi)) (2.3)
pi∗i = Ai ·max
(
piwi , pi
0
i
)
(2.4)
where pi∗i is the unit’s total profits, scaled by its operation size, Ai. If pi
w
i − pi0i > 0, the
unit will choose to produce with the damaging input. If piwi − pi0i ≤ 0, the unit will choose
to produce without it. For simplicity, I call this difference the profitability of the damaging
input, or the damaging input’s marginal value, piν :
piνi = pi
w
i − pi0i (2.5)
Any unit causes an externality such that:
di = Ai · γi · wi (2.6)
D =
∑
i
di (2.7)
where di is unit i’s externality, γi is a transfer function that relates unit i’s production pro-
cesses to its resulting externalities, and D is the total externality caused by the industry.
Notice that a unit operating without wi will not cause an externality. Notice also that a
unit’s externality is linear in its input use and size. While γ is a fixed factor for each unit,
and therefore the externality is linear in γ, the transfer function γ itself is not necessarily
linearly related to production processes.
The regulator decides to limit the total externality D first by setting an upper limit, A¯,
on the total size of externality-causing production such that:
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∑
i
(Ai | wi > 0) = A¯. (2.8)
In other words, the regulator can observe the use of the damaging input and only permits
some units to use it, therefore restricting entry by others into the industry. At the time of
the regulator’s decision to place the upper limit A¯, I assume: all units who wished to use the
input could; all units that use the input made a larger profit relative to production without
it; those that did not use the input made a larger relative profit through other activities; in
the future, some units restricted from using the input would make a larger profit compared
to their current production activity without it. Relative changes in prices or technology
could alter this in the future, driving interest in entry into the industry.
For now, consider only the units who use input w. The regulator has restricted other units
from entering the industry and contributing to the externality, but the regulator decides to
reduce the total externality D. The regulator can do so in a variety of ways, each with
different individual and aggregate outcomes. The first-best solution is a tax, τ , on the true
marginal externality:
τ · γi · wi ∀i. (2.9)
But because of limitations to monitor a unit’s externality d, its input use w, or even its
output y directly, a tax on any of these is impracticable. Instead, the first-best solution is
a tax on the expected marginal externality, γ · E[w], where E[w] is the expectation of input
use.
τ · γi · E[w] ∀i (2.10)
Therefore, the survival region, or the area in which firms remain in production, is:
piwi − τ · γi · E[w] ≥ pi0i (2.11)
piνi − τ · γi · E[w] ≥ 0 (2.12)
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which corresponds graphically to the region OFBC in Figure 1. The units in area OAF will
find it unprofitable under this tax to use the damaging input. From Figure 1, this tax as it
becomes more restrictive will pivot about the origin. Essentially, units with a higher ratio
of expected marginal externality to profitability than the tax rate will choose to exit the
damaging industry, while firms with ratios lower than the tax rate will continue operating.
If there is little variability in input use, then the tax on the expected marginal externality
should generate most of the gains that a tax on the true marginal externality would, with full
information about input use. If however the variability in input use is large, the uncertainty
will lead to significant inefficiencies. To explore how uncertainty propagates in the expected
marginal externality tax, I will compare it directly with the tax on the true marginal exter-
nality. Notice that a tax on the true marginal externality could lead to adjustments on the
intensive margin, as a unit has an incentive to reduce input use in the case of a true marginal
externality tax. This is not so with a tax on the expected marginal externality since input
use is unobserved and the unit’s transfer function, γ, is fixed. To make this comparison, I
assume that producing units cannot respond to taxation by adjusting input use per unit of
output (i.e., units cannot adjust production on the intensive margin). Recall the assumption
that there exists a fixed proportions relationship between input and output in microparam-
eter models such as the one developed here, which is supported by the literature [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19]. If this assumption holds, then a tax on the true marginal externality has a
similar survival region to that of the expected marginal externality, except that input use is
also taxed rather than the expectation of it:
piνi − τ · γi · w∗ ≥ 0. (2.13)
Let’s return to the case where there is uncertainty regarding input use or output. The
regulator can use two other policies: a cap on the transfer function (equivalently, a cap on
the expected marginal externality), which I call “zoning”, or a tax on the size of the unit,
which I call a “land tax”. Under a zoning policy, only units with:
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γi ≤ Γ (2.14)
may operate, where Γ is the upper limit on the transfer function (equivalently, the upper
limit on the expected marginal externality is Γ · E[w]). Graphically, the units in region
DABG on Figure 1 will be pushed out of production, while those in ODGC will continue
doing so. Under the land tax, a unit is charged a tax λ on the basis of its production size
so that the survival region is:
piνi − λ ≥ 0 (2.15)
corresponding graphically to units in area HEBC in Figure 1, pushing out of production
those in area OAEH.
Zoning, unlike the tax on the marginal externality, completely ignores a unit’s profitability.
It only considers a unit’s marginal externality, having potentially very costly repercussions.
The land tax, on the other hand, is blind to the marginal externality, and pushes out the
least profitable units regardless of their damage, potentially having little effect on reducing
the externality. These results depend on the joint distribution of the marginal externality
and the profitability of the units. With a strongly negative correlation between the marginal
externality and the profitability, the zoning, land tax, and marginal externality tax behave
very similarly, as the most damaging units are also the least profitable. If a strongly positive
correlation exists, the policies behave quite differently: zoning (the land tax) removes the
most (least) damaging and most (least) profitable units so that the largest (smallest) reduc-
tions in the externality happen at the earliest stages of abatement, as well as the largest
(smallest) costs. To achieve increasing levels of abatement, zoning (the land tax) must re-
move increasingly more (fewer) production units, since the remaining units have a decreasing
(increasing) effect on the externality. The tax on the marginal externality, for a strongly
positive correlation, has nearly no preference for which units to remove in which order; all
have the same or similar marginal externalities per unit profitability. These relationships are
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an elaboration and extension of the insights gained by Green and Sunding [17], a summary
of which is provided in Table 1.
The aforementioned policies are somewhat similar to those previously studied in the mi-
croparameter literature, except that past work has focused on policies requiring information
that is not easily observable: pollution, input, and output [15], [16], [17]. The policies ex-
amined here instead reflect values that are observable in practice.
Also notice that in this analysis I assume a linear damage function exists, and so the cost
of the policy is simply the sum in foregone profits by the production units. If instead there
existed a convex damage function, a regulator would prefer instruments that more rapidly
targeted the externality; in particular, the zoning policy. The additional costs that may be
incurred could be outweighed by the benefits of abatement.
Now let us consider the case where reallocation is allowed between units, giving rise to a
new set of policies. There is a subset of units who use the damaging input, and some that
do not but would like to. In other words, the restriction A¯ is binding. If this condition is
met, and if the profitability of using the damaging input is larger for a non-damaging unit
than for a currently damaging unit, the units will benefit from reallocation; this corresponds
to a tradable permit system.
I consider three types of trading schemes: one without trading ratios (one-to-one trad-
ing), one with trading ratios (bidirectional trading), and one with asymmetrical trading
ratios (unidirectional trading).
With one-to-one trading, unit b without the right to use the damaging input wishes to
purchase the right if its profitability of using the input is larger than that of unit s with the
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right. Mathematically, units b and s are interested in trading if:
piνb > pi
ν
s . (2.16)
Assuming that the limiting factor of expansion and reduction is operating size, these units
trade up to b’s ability to expand its damaging operations or s’s ability to reduce its opera-
tions, so that they trade:
min (Ab, As) . (2.17)
Under the one-to-one trading scheme, the total scale of the damaging industry (
∑
(Ai | wi >
0)) stays the same but the change in the externality is uncertain. If on average, buyers cause
higher (lower) damage than sellers, the total expected externality (
∑
(Ai ·γi ·E[w] | wi > 0))
will increase (decrease).
The ratio, or bidirectional, trading scheme also takes into consideration the trading units’
transfer functions. This scheme aims to keep the externality exactly where it currently is by
adjusting the scale of the production proportionately to the change in its expected marginal
externality. In this case, buyer b is interested in purchasing the right to pollute from seller
s if:
piνb
γb
>
piνs
γs
(2.18)
and the parties are again limited by their ability to expand or reduce their operations,
weighted by their transfer functions:
min (Ab · γb, As · γs) . (2.19)
In this trading scheme, the scale of the industry (
∑
(Ai | wi > 0)) goes up (down) if
the buyers have smaller (larger) transfer functions than the sellers, but the total expected
externality (
∑
(Ai · γi · E[w] | wi > 0)) is designed to stay the same.
10
The unidirectional trading scheme is a blend of one-to-one trading and bidirectional trad-
ing with the intent of hedging against uncertainty of variability in the damaging input. If
the buyer has a larger (smaller) transfer function than the seller, the transaction is treated
as ratio (one-to-one) trading. In this scheme, the scale of the industry cannot increase as in
bidirectional trading, nor can the total expected externality increase as in one-to-one trad-
ing. With any trade, the scale either stays the same and the expectation of the externality
decreases or the scale decreases and the expectation of the externality stays the same. Units
b and s will be interested in trading if:pi
ν
b > pi
ν
s , if γb ≤ γs
piνb
γb
> pi
ν
s
γs
, otherwise.
(2.20)
The parties will be subject to the scaling constraints again according to the relative magni-
tudes of their transfer functions, given by:min (Ab, As) , if γb ≤ γsmin (Ab · γb, As · γs) , otherwise. (2.21)
Unidirectional trading may behave more like one-to-one trading or more like bidirectional
trading depending on the joint distributions of γ and piν . If a negative correlation exists,
unidirectional trading should behave more like one-to-one trading; the right to use the dam-
aging input is moving from sellers with high expected damage to buyers with low expected
damage, resulting in a one-to-one transaction. If a positive correlation exists, unidirectional
trading behaves more similarly to bidirectional trading, with permits moving from sellers
with low expected damage to buyers with high expected damage, resulting in a discounted
trade.
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Empirical Application
The Platte River Basin flows from west to east, extending through the states of Wyoming,
Colorado, and Nebraska. The Platte River serves as critical habitat to one endangered and
three threatened species listed under the Federal Endangered Species Act [20]. In an effort
to restore habitat, the three states are participating in a cooperative agreement to reduce
water usage. In this application, I focus on one particular jurisdiction within the Basin: the
Twin Platte Natural Resources District (Twin Platte NRD or “the District”), located in
western Nebraska. For a map of the District, see Figure 2.
The Twin Platte NRD is one of 23 Natural Resources Districts (NRDs) in Nebraska. Local
NRDs are governmental authorities charged by the State of Nebraska with the responsibility
of managing its soils and water. NRDs have the authority to regulate the extraction and
use of groundwater: they can set a well moratorium, cap and certify irrigated acres, and
levy taxes. Importantly, NRDs have the authority to enact any of the policies analyzed here;
the regulatory framework of the Twin Platte NRD in particular conforms to the model setup.
The Twin Platte NRD encompasses four counties that overlay the Ogallala Aquifer, an
unconfined aquifer that is hydrologically connected to the Platte River. Groundwater is an
abundant and valuable resource for the region, whose economy is driven by irrigated agri-
culture. Surface water and groundwater irrigate approximately 325,000 acres of farmland in
the District [21].
Intensive groundwater pumping has led to decreased surface water flows in the Platte
River. The District, with its authority to regulate groundwater, has undertaken a number
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of actions to curb water usage and supplement surface water flows. The District placed a
moratorium on the drilling of wells in 2004, capped and certified irrigated acres in 2004,
and implemented in 2005 a unidirectional trading scheme for certified irrigated acres. More
recently, the District in 2013 began the construction of a stream augmentation project and
in 2014 levied an “occupation tax”, or land tax, on irrigated acres.
The Twin Platte NRD is interested in reducing stream depletion while providing flexibility
to its agricultural producers. As such, the District does not meter or set allocations of
groundwater extraction. In 2005, the District implemented a trading scheme of irrigated
land, which considers the expected marginal damage and land size, and has had almost 200
transactions to date (see Table 2). The nature of these regulations makes an interesting case
study for this work, and illustrates this work’s policy relevance.
Data Description
I make use of primary and derived section-level hydrologic, agronomic, and economic data in
the Twin Platte NRD. I do so by employing a number of publicly available data sources and
decision-making tools. I find the profitability of irrigation for each section, which depends
on local parameters such as climate, soil type, variable cost of groundwater pumping, and
well yield, the rate at which a well can pump water. Then I use relationships between
groundwater and surface water interactions to find the marginal externality of groundwater
pumping on surface water flows, called the stream depletion factor. Summary statistics of
these properties are available in Table 3. Notice the wide range of variability in the marginal
value of irrigation and the stream depletion factor, but the small variability in irrigation
application. Graphical representations of these properties can be found in Figures 3 and 4.
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Marginal Value
Economic Data
To obtain each section’s marginal value of irrigation, I derive the difference between its
profit-maximizing irrigated and dryland profits per acre. I find these values by using the
2010 single-year, single-field version of Water Optimizer, an agricultural decision support
tool that predicts the profit-maximizing strategy based on field-level characteristics [22].
Using data from the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) National Agricul-
tural Statistics Service (NASS), I allow producers to choose between the four predominant
crops grown in the region in the 10-year period from 2003 to 2012, which are alfalfa, corn,
sorghum, and wheat [23].
I use all input and output prices, such as commodity prices, and fixed and variable costs
of production, given in Water Optimizer, which their developers obtained through sources
such as NASS, the Nebraska Energy Office, and the Chicago Board of Trade [22].
Well Data
To obtain the variable costs of pumping, I assume that all producers have center pivot
irrigation, powered by electricity with pumping efficiency of 90 percent. The Nebraska
Department of Natural Resources has publicly available well records that include well yield
and depth to water [24], also crucial components to the cost of pumping. I specifically use a
subset of these well records, looking at active wells used for irrigation, and interpolate well
yield and depth to water at the centroid of each section.
Agronomic Data
Water Optimizer embeds climate characteristics by looking at long-term average conditions
in each county. Based on field-level studies, it provides the maximum irrigated and dryland
yields and the maximum irrigation application by county. I pinpoint these values to the
county centroids, and then interpolate to the section level.
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Physical Data
Soil types greatly affect the quality of the land, as well as the soil’s ability to retain water.
As an example, fine soils that have small pore space better retain applied irrigation water in
the root zone of the crop compared to coarse soils. The implication of this is that producers
with coarse soils often must apply more irrigation water to meet the crop requirement. As
such, one of the key inputs to Water Optimizer is the land’s soil type. Using the National
Resource Conservation Service’s soil survey, STATSGO, I find the predominant soil type of
each section.
Much of the land in the Twin Platte NRD is hilly and unsuitable for irrigated agricul-
ture, as it causes erosion and is difficult to operate machinery. Instead, sloping lands are
used primarily as rangeland; the District also restricts lands with a 10 percent grade from
acquiring certified irrigated acres to limit soil erosion. I find that removing these sections
is important for the analysis; otherwise, the simulation results in irrigated land moving to
areas that are not realistically suitable for irrigation. Therefore, I use elevation data to find
the slopes within each section, and then remove sections that contain a slope of 10 percent
or more1. A visualization of the existing certified irrigated acres and the sections of land
remaining in the analysis can be found in Figure 2.
Marginal Externality
To quantify the depleting effect of groundwater pumping on surface water flows, the Twin
Platte NRD has partnered with other districts in the Nebraskan portion of the Platte River
Basin. To assist in policy analysis, the districts developed a joint surface water-groundwater
model, called the Platte River Cooperative Hydrologic Study (COHYST). COHYST links
a surface water model created using STELLA and a groundwater model created using the
United States Geological Survey’s MODFLOW.
1Of the 325,000 irrigated acres in the District, only about 78,000 irrigated acres overlap with the sections
I include in the analysis. These fields that have 10 percent slopes may either be grandfathered into irrigation
rights or contain a very small area of sloping land.
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The model simulates the effects of seasonal, cyclical groundwater pumping over a 50-year
period, calculating the proportion of pumped groundwater that reduces baseflow to the
Platte River. This proportion is called a stream depletion factor (SDF), equivalent to the
transfer function, and which takes on a number between 0 and 1. There is wide variability
of section-level SDFs in the District, and those with the highest SDFs are typically closest
to the streams. Figure 5 illustrates how this trait varies spatially.
Then, to obtain field-level irrigation application, I use the unconstrained and profit-
maximizing values given by Water Optimizer. The product of irrigation application and
the SDF will give the true marginal externality of each section.
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Results
Using the microparameter model developed, I compare the aggregate reduction in industry
profits under zoning, tax, and trading policies to regulate a spatially heterogeneous exter-
nality. I perform two types of analyses in this section. First, I generate synthetic data by
randomly drawing from prescribed distributions of producing units’ characteristics, allowing
me to observe whether findings are robust or sensitive to specific relationships. I then apply
the model to the case study of the Twin Platte NRD.
I assume that the regulator can obtain information on the transfer function and the size
of a firm, but that a firm’s profitability and input use are only known privately. A regulator
could infer a firm’s profitability by observing how it responds to increasing taxes on its firm
size or transfer function, but input use would be much harder, if not impossible, to infer
without additional resources. However, I do consider input use in calculating the reduction
in the externality.
Simulation of Synthetic Data
In this simulation, I randomly draw from distributions of input use w, scale of production
A, profitability piν , and transfer function γ for 1,000 producing units, half of which currently
produce with the polluting input and the rest which do not. I assume that input use among
units is normally distributed, with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.1. The
remaining properties are uniformly distributed. All values are normalized between 0 and 1
and are sampled using Cholesky decomposition to achieve the desired covariances.
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I induce correlations between firm properties, ranging from -1 and +1, to explore how
relationships that may exist in the real world affect the relative performance of the policies
considered. For example, if the profitability of the polluting activity is negatively correlated
with the firm’s marginal externality, then a policy that targets highly damaging firms should
be quite cost-effective since firms with high marginal externalities also have lower profitabil-
ity. In particular, I am interested in correlations between the profitability of the damaging
activity piν and each of the two components of the true marginal externality, input use w
and transfer function γ (equivalent to the expected marginal externality).
Correlation: Profitability and Input Use
In this scenario, I test correlations between firms’ input use w and the profitability of the
input piν . A negative (positive) correlation will mean that firms with higher profitability
generally use less (more) of the damaging input. For these tests, the correlation between the
profitability and the transfer function is zero.
As expected from the model, if the distribution of input use has little variation compared
to that of the transfer function, differing correlations between profitability and input use have
little effect on the relative performance of the policies. In some respect, this is a surprising
and yet intuitive result: uncertainty in input use does not result in negative environmental
or economic outcomes. Policies that do not directly meter input use w can still achieve most
of the gains that one with perfect information would. This result is driven by the relatively
smaller variability in input use w compared to that of the transfer function γ. This result
does not hold if input use has comparatively similar or larger variability than the transfer
function. This is an important empirical question for its application.
Correlation: Profitability and Transfer Function
Here I test the correlations between units’ profitability piν of the damaging input and their
transfer function γ. A negative (positive) correlation will mean that units with higher
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profitability have a lower (higher) transfer function. For these tests, the correlation between
the profitability and the input use is zero.
Negative Correlation
A negative correlation between piν and γ means that units with low profitability have high
marginal damage, and that producers with high profitability have low marginal damage.
Recall from Table 1 that all tax and zoning policies, ones that target high-damaging, low-
profitability, or a blend of these, are very cost effective at low abatement levels and very
costly at high abatement levels. The tax and zoning policies retire approximately the same
producing units in the same order when a strong negative correlation exists. As a result
of the negative correlation, it is very cheap to achieve low abatement levels, but becomes
increasingly expensive as the abatement level increases, the intuition behind the curvature
in Figure 8. At the lowest levels of abatement, the least profitable and most damaging units
are being retired; at the highest levels of abatement, the most profitable and least damaging
units are being retired.
In the case of a negative correlation, reductions of industry size to achieve a given abate-
ment level are also closer to being the same across tax and zoning policies (see Figure 6);
this is a combined result of the policies targeting approximately the same producers in the
same order and the policies achieving the same environmental and economic outcomes no
matter the way in which the units are targeted.
As a result of this negative correlation, the relative cost-savings between alternative tax
and zoning policies are small. This result is consistent with prior work, such as Babcock
et al., which finds that negative correlations make simple, easily observable proxies good
substitutes for spatially targeted policies [10].
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Positive Correlation
A positive correlation means that units with higher marginal externalities are also the most
productive. This is not an ideal case, as policies are very costly at lower abatement levels.
As seen from Figure 9, the curvature of the policy cost becomes more linear under a positive
correlation. In other words, the marginal costs to achieve any abatement level are nearly the
same everywhere. The intuition behind this is that for approximately every unit increase in
abatement, a similar unit cost is incurred under a positive correlation. Therefore, reduction
in profitability becomes approximately linear with respect to abatement level under more
positive relationships. If a perfectly linear and positive relationship exists between the prof-
itability and the transfer function, then all tax and zoning policies behave almost identically
in terms of the reductions in profitability to decrease the externality.
Yet, under positive correlations, the relationship between reductions of the externality
and of industry size are quite different between policies, as illustrated in Figure 7. This is
because the ordering of producers who are pushed out of production is different (see Table
1). The zoning policy and the land tax in fact have an almost completely opposite ranking
to retire producers, whereas the tax on the transfer function is indifferent of the order, as
every unit has approximately the same γ
piν
. For the land tax to achieve the same level of
abatement as zoning, it must retire many more units since it targets low-productivity units
first, which are also low-damaging in this case.
Tax and Zoning Policies
Looking at Figures 6 and 7 as examples, the zoning policy is very effective at reducing the
externality per reduction in industry size across negative and positive correlations. Zoning
is the only policy that ignores the unit’s profitability, so that regardless of the relationship
between piν and γ, the most damaging units will be retired first, keeping relatively many
more units in production than that of other policies. The zoning policy almost always leaves
in production the largest amount of total damaging units to achieve the same abatement
compared to any other policy; the only exception being that when a strong negative correla-
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tion exists, zoning is outperformed by the bidirectional and unidirectional trading schemes
(discussed below). Of the tax policies, the land tax is the least effective at reducing the
externality with the reduction in industry size, as it is blind to contributing components of
the externality. This is particularly true for positive correlations between piν and γ, as it
retires first those units with low profitability and therefore low marginal damage. The land
tax must retire many more units in order to achieve the same abatement level as the zoning
policy.
Looking instead at the performance of policies in terms of reductions in profitability, as
seen in Figures 8 and 9, zoning is very costly, and especially with highly positive correla-
tions as anticipated in the model. Zoning in this case pushes out the most damaging and
most productive units out of production in the beginning. For either a positive or negative
correlation, there exists an interesting abatement level at which the land tax becomes more
costly than the zoning policy. As abatement targets go up, the effectiveness of the zoning
policy to achieve that target deteriorates quickly, as it takes more and more units, regardless
of profitability, to retire. In other words, these units have progressively smaller and smaller
effects on reducing the externality. The land tax, which ignores the transfer function, con-
tinues pushing out production units with high marginal damage, even at high abatement
targets.
Of the tax policies, the most costly policy is zoning at low abatement levels and the
land tax at high abatement levels. Importantly, across correlations, the tax on the transfer
function achieves most of the gains that a tax with perfect information would achieve. These
two taxes are the least costly of the tax and zoning policies at all levels of abatement and
across correlations. See the overlap between the two policies in Figures 8 and 9.
Tradable Permit Systems
Allowing for entry into the economy, the introduction of trading programs presents large
cost-savings opportunities that could not be realized by tax or zoning policies amongst ex-
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isting users. New producers that have smaller transfer functions or larger profitability are
able to replace those with higher transfer functions or who are less profitable. Especially in
the case of a negative correlation, introducing any type of trade increases aggregate prof-
itability. Bidirectional trading under any correlation is the first-best policy under imperfect
information, as it allows for the expansion of industry size while maintaining the existing
abatement level (see Figures 8 and 9).
Unidirectional and one-to-one trading in the case of a negative correlation lead to im-
mediate reductions in the externality, without the need to reduce the size of the industry
(see Figure 8). This is because buyers of permits are those who are more profitable and
less damaging than the sellers of permits, leading to economic and environmental benefits
immediately.
As expected in the model, unidirectional trading behaves most similarly to one-to-one trad-
ing when a negative correlation exists, and most like bidirectional trading when a positive
correlation exists. Recall that unidirectional trading is a blend of the two trading schemes.
When a negative correlation exists, buyers generally have lower marginal externalities than
sellers; the program stipulates that such transfers be done at a one-to-one rate. When a
positive correlation exists, the opposite is true: buyers have a higher transfer function than
sellers and must discount their transaction proportionately, as done in bidirectional trading.
There is one exception when a trading program can cause large, unexpected damages. The
one-to-one trading scheme in the presence of a positive correlation can lead to an increase
in the externality, as the buyers are those with high transfer functions and the sellers are
those with low transfer functions (see Figure 9). Because this trading scheme ignores the
relative differences between the buyer’s and seller’s transfer functions, and simply exchanges
at a one-to-one rate, aggregate damage will increase under a positive correlation. Notice in
Figure 7 that in order to maintain the initial abatement level, approximately two-fifths of
the industry size must be reduced under one-to-one trading.
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Like the tax and zoning policies, the trading programs have increasingly linear effects
of total costs with abatement level as the correlation becomes more positive, for the same
reason stated earlier. Still, their benefits of increasing profitability relative to the other
policies is substantial and fairly robust across correlations. Bidirectional trading is always
most cost-effective of all policies at decreasing the externality. Interestingly, the magnitude
of cost-savings between this first-best solution and its alternatives are much larger under
negative correlations than under positive correlations, a result that is different than that
found in the existing literature. This finding is driven by allowing entry into the industry,
whereas prior work did not.
Interesting relationships between industry size and abatement also emerge: consistently,
bidirectional trading has a linear relationship, achieving a fixed quantity of abatement per
reduction in industry size. In fact, this is actually a defining feature of the bidirectional
policy, as it neither abates more or less than expected at a particular industry size, unlike
any other policy. From a regulatory perspective, this is a nice feature of bidirectional trading
in that in order to reduce damage by a certain proportion it is clear that a reduction in
industry size by that same proportion is necessary. Under a negative correlation, all other
policies outperform bidirectional trading with respect to industry size, but the relationship
is nonlinear. See Figure 6 for the graphical illustration.
Simulation of Empirical Data
The properties of irrigated and dryland producers in the Twin Platte NRD are mapped in
Figure 3. Notice the wide range of variability in their transfer functions, which is the SDF,
and little to no correlation with the profitability of irrigation. Also notice the sizable overlap
between the profitability of irrigated and dryland fields; this indicates interest in entry into
the industry of irrigated agriculture.
In the case of stream depletion, the expected marginal externality or transfer tax is equiv-
alent to the tax on the SDF and the tax on the true marginal externality is equivalent to a
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tax on stream depletion. The SDF tax and the zoning policy perform very similarly to the
tax on stream depletion (see Figure 10), indicating that the predominant driver of stream
depletion in the Twin Platte NRD is the SDF, not water use. The land tax at all levels of
abatement is the least cost-effective to increase streamflow in the Platte River. One-to-one
and unidirectional trading behave quite similarly to one another, meaning that buyers of ir-
rigated land have smaller SDFs than the sellers. Additionally, one-to-one and unidirectional
trading are more cost-effective than the tax on stream depletion to about 18,000 and 24,000
acre-feet of increased streamflow, respectively (see Figure 10). For perspective, the Twin
Platte NRD is looking to reduce stream depletion by 7,700 acre-feet. Bidirectional trading
is by far the most cost-effective policy, as irrigated acres expand in the regions that have the
lowest SDFs. To achieve the increased streamflow target of 7,700 acre-feet, a bidirectional
trading scheme would actually increase profitability in the District by an estimated $35 mil-
lion.
Interestingly, unidirectional trading has a fairly linear relationship between streamflow
enhancements and retired irrigated land permits, a defining characteristic of bidirectional
trading (see Figure 11). Unidirectional trading also has the unique ability in this case
to increase streamflow significantly while maintaining the same quantity of irrigated land.
Zoning, the SDF tax, and the depletion tax keep the most amount of irrigated land in
production at almost every level of reduction, as they push out the most damaging lands
first.
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Conclusions
Spatially heterogeneous externalities are abundant in the real-world, but the ability to moni-
tor the polluting inputs or resulting damage is not. Consequently, management strategies in
practice have effects on firms’ production at the external margin. In this paper, I present and
analyze alternative policies that can be implemented with more readily observable proper-
ties, using a microparameter framework to capture the discrete nature of firm characteristics
and regulatory action.
I find that regardless of the correlation between input use and profitability, the differences
in aggregate abatement, costs, and industry size are negligible. The ranking of policies also
goes unchanged across correlations. Comparing the performances of a true marginal exter-
nality tax and a transfer function tax, the welfare loss of imperfect monitoring is small, a
result that is surprising and debunks concerns regarding imperfect monitoring of input use.
This result is driven by the assumption that the transfer function has much larger variability
than input use, one that is substantiated by the empirical evidence of the application studied
here. This has important and interesting implications for other nonpoint source pollution
problems, where loading rates or input use may be inconsequential compared to other firm
characteristics, such as its distance to the region of concern.
This work also illustrates the importance of the correlation between a firm’s transfer func-
tion and marginal value of the damaging input. The magnitude of cost-savings between
alternative policies depends critically on this relationship: under a negative correlation, al-
ternative tax policies on existing users have little differences in welfare loss, while under a
positive correlation, the differences are large. Interestingly though, it is under a negative
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correlation that the cost-savings of allowing entry through tradable permit systems are most
stark.
Allowing entry through any tradable permit system achieves economic gains not possible
through tax and zoning instruments at reasonable reductions in the externality. However,
one-to-one trading can result in negative and unexpected damages in some cases.
The Twin Platte NRD currently has a unidirectional policy and would be able to achieve
their goals for streamflow enhancements, but at significant loss in profit compared to the
bidirectional trading scheme. Still, many more transactions would have to occur in order
for this streamflow target to be realized. I assumed frictionless trading in my model, but it
may be the case that high transaction costs are impeding trade.
The simulation of the Twin Platte NRD illustrates the importance of local factors that
drive cost-effectiveness. At low levels of abatement, the tax and zoning instruments behave
very similarly while trading policies provide the opportunity for additional economic and
environmental gains. This is especially true for the bidirectional trading scheme. Unlike
Kuwayama and Brozovic´’s findings, this spatially differentiated scheme is not approximated
by one-to-one trading at low abatement levels. This may be driven by the primary dis-
tinction between the two studies: Kuwayama and Brozovic´’s model allows for continuous
regulations, a reflection of the policies in the Republican River Basin [13], while this work
looks at regulations that operate on the extensive margin, a reflection of the policies in the
Platte River Basin. Interestingly, the Republican and the Platte River Basins neighbor one
another and yet are drastically different in terms of their policy options. The importance of
understanding local institutions and implementing tailored solutions to match the environ-
mental and societal problems cannot be overstated.
While I compared the aggregate reduction in profits to achieve increasing abatement lev-
els, I have not yet performed firm-level welfare analyses. These would provide important
insights about the distribution of losses and equity of the policy instruments. Further, from
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an analytical perspective, allowing entry and exit is also possible by removing the binding
cap on the industry size and implementing a tax, the first-best of which would be the transfer
tax. To complement the work done here, I will conduct these analyses as next steps.
In order to compare a tax with perfect information to its closest substitutes, I made the
assumption that firms do not make intensive adjustments of input use, which may be the
case for some industries but not all. Much theoretical work shows that firms, responding
to regulations on input use, will make intensive adjustments. Future work could explore in
which industries and under circumstances policies that enable intensive adjustments lead to
significant welfare gains. Of course, this requires monitoring and such an analysis should
consider its cost. Therefore, while this model has allowed me to draw conclusions regarding
imperfect monitoring, I cannot draw any regarding the welfare loss of regulations that affect
intensive rather than extensive adjustments. Work that analyzed these differences would
add to the literature on the value of information.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Comparison of Policy Instruments by Correlation Between γ and piν
The abatement relationship ∂−(∂A¯) relates how, as each of the policies becomes more
restrictive, the properties of the producing units it affects change. As an example, as the
land tax τ is raised, the industry size A¯ is shrinking and the profitability of units piν it
affects is increasing.
Correlation
Abatement Transfer
Zoning Land Tax
Relationship Function Tax
+1
∂γ
−(∂A¯) = 0 < 0 > 0
∂piν
−(∂A¯) = 0 < 0 > 0
−1
∂γ
−(∂A¯) < 0 < 0 < 0
∂piν
−(∂A¯) > 0 > 0 > 0
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Table 2: Summary of Transfers in the Twin Platte NRD
Year Transfers
2005 4
2006 0
2007 1
2008 9
2009 29
2010 26
2011 32
2012 40
2013 33
2014 9
Total through February 2014 183
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Section-Level Values in the Twin Platte NRD
Variable (n = 1450) Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Irrigated profits per acre, $/ac 391.50 32.26 183.47 459.98
Dryland profits per acre, $/ac 124.97 46.17 0 219.79
Marginal value of irrigation, $/ac 266.53 38.21 53.69 384.45
Total available land area, ac 639.17 16.19 555.62 745.60
Maximum irrigated land area, ac 540.52 87.14 0 714.87
Existing irrigated acres, ac 53.68 134.249 0 614.8475
Existing dryland acres, ac 585.49 134.60 11.18 744.58
Irrigation application, ac-in/ac 14.89 1.32 7.05 29.23
Stream depletion factor, % 48.97 29.29 1 98
Stream depletion per acre, ac-in/ac 7.25 4.38 0 15.55
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Figure 1: Graphical Illustration of Microparameter Policies
(1) A land tax is a flat tax based on the size of the producing unit, affecting the least
profitable units first. Under a land tax, units in OAEH no longer find it profitable to use
the polluting input while units in HEBC continue producing. (2) Zoning sets a cap on the
expected marginal externality of producing units so that any unit above this cap may not
operate. The units in DABG are removed and the units in ODGC may continue operating.
(3) The transfer function tax (or the expected marginal externality) makes it unprofitable
for units with a high ratio of expected marginal externality to profitability. In the triangle
OAF, units will not produce under the transfer function tax. In the space OFBC, units
will continue operating.
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Figure 2: Twin Platte NRD: Study Area
The above map shows the District’s location within Nebraska, its boundary, and the
stream network. Also depicted are the existing certified irrigated acres in the District,
totaling approximately 350,000 acres, and the sections that I analyze in this work, having
slopes of less than 10 percent.
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Figure 3: Twin Platte NRD: Producer Properties
The figure depicts irrigated fields on the left and dryland fields on the right. Their
marginal value of irrigation is along the horizontal axis and their transfer functions, the
stream depletion factors, of irrigation along the vertical axis. The points are weighted by
field size.
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Figure 4: Twin Platte NRD: Variability of Irrigation Application and Transfer Function
The profit-maximizing irrigation application is relatively uniform across the District, but
there is high variability in the stream depletion factor.
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Figure 5: Twin Platte NRD: Spatial Heterogeneity
The spatial heterogeneity of the transfer function varies from 0 to 100 percent in the
District, largely dependent on the closeness of the section to the stream network.
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Figure 6: Reductions of the Externality with Reductions in Industry Size for a Strong,
Negative Correlation Between piν and γ
One-to-one and bidirectional trading result in the largest industry size for the same
abatement levels for nearly 50% of the possible abatement. The tax and zoning policies
behave similarly to one another as they retire approximately the same producing units in
the same order. The bidirectional trading scheme is linear by design, only abating with
retirements in industry size.
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Figure 7: Reductions of the Externality with Reductions in Industry Size for a Strong,
Positive Correlation Between piν and γ
One-to-one trading, which performed especially well under a negative correlation, performs
poorly under a positive correlation. Zoning and the bidirectional trading have the same
relationships that they did under negative correlations. In this case, unidirectional trading
is similar to bidirectional trading. The land tax is highly inefficient under positive
correlations.
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Figure 8: Comparison of Alternative Policies Under a Strong, Negative Correlation
Between piν and γ
Notice the curvature of the policies, which indicates at lower levels of abatement, it is very
cost-effective to decrease the externality. Notice also that the tax and zoning polices
perform very similarly to one another, with negligible differences in total costs. Trading
schemes offer environmental and economic gains not possible through tax instruments. For
the case of a negative correlation, unidirectional trading approximates one-to-one trading,
as buyers have lower expected marginal externalities than sellers, resulting in a one-to-one
trading ratio under the unidirectional scheme.
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Figure 9: Comparison of Alternative Policies Under a Strong, Positive Correlation Between
piν and γ
Each policy is fairly linear in costs with respect to abatement level, and yet there are more
noticeable differences in policy costs. One-to-one trading results in disastrous consequences
for abatement, and is quickly outperformed by tax policies. In this case, unidirectional
trading approximates bidirectional trading, as buyers have higher expected marginal
externalities than sellers, resulting in a discounted trading ratio under the unidirectional
scheme. Unidirectional and bidirectional trading still outperform the tax policies
significantly.
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Figure 10: Twin Platte NRD: Policy Costs with Streamflow Enhancements
As restrictions increase, streamflow increases and costs are incurred. Zoning and a tax on the
SDF perform as well as the depletion tax, with perfect information. Tradable permit systems
can result in economic gains that could not be realized through even the most effective tax
policy.
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Figure 11: Twin Platte NRD: Streamflow Enhancements with Reductions in Irrigated Land
Using different policy mechanisms, the total quantity of irrigated land must be reduced by
varying amounts to achieve the same streamflow target. Zoning, the SDF tax, and the
depletion tax consistently perform very well, as they always push out the most damaging
lands first, and therefore have high abatement to retired land ratios.
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Appendix A: Supplemental Figures
Figure A.1: Comparison of Alternative Policies Under a Perfectly Negative Correlation
Between piν and γ
In this case, all trading policies overlap with one another and all tax policies overlap with
one another. Trading policies are much more cost-effective.
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Figure A.2: Reductions of the Externality with Reductions in Industry Size for a Perfectly
Negative Correlation Between piν and γ
In this case, unidirectional and one-to-one trading schemes overlap; tax policies overlap;
bidirectional trading is linear (as it is across all correlations).
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Figure A.3: Comparison of Alternative Policies with No Correlation Between piν and γ
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Figure A.4: Reductions of the Externality with Reductions in Industry Size with No
Negative Correlation Between piν and γ
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Figure A.5: Comparison of Alternative Policies Under a Perfectly Positive Correlation
Between piν and γ
In this case, tax and trading policies overlap greatly with one another and a strong, linear
relationship exists between abatement and policy cost.
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Figure A.6: Reductions of the Externality with Reductions in Industry Size for a Perfectly
Positive Correlation Between piν and γ
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Appendix B: Computer Code
The following codes were used for simulating the policy analyses using the synthetic data and
the Twin Platte NRD data. The codes are quite similar, only with differences in generation.
Random Simulation
1 %Comparing policies in a microparameter framework
2 %Policies include zoning, SD tax, input tax, 1:1 trading, bi-directional ...
and uni-directional SDF trading
3 %Written by Richael K. Young, December 2013
4
5 %http://comisef.wikidot.com/tutorial:correlateduniformvariates
6 clear all
7 close all force
8 close all hidden
9
10 tic
11
12 % generate normals
13 n = 500;
14 mu = 0.5;
15 sd = 0.1;
16 XI = [mu + sd*randn(n,1) randn(n,3)];
17 XD = [mu + sd*randn(n,1) randn(n,3)];
18
19 % desired correlation
47
20 % (1) water usage (2) change in yields, (3) SDF, (4) irrigated acres
21 V1 = 1;
22 V2 = V1;
23 V3 = V1;
24 V4 = V1;
25
26 C12 = 0;
27 C13 = 0;
28 C14 = 0;
29 C23 = 0;
30 C24 = 0;
31 C34 = 0;
32
33 %Correlation coefficients analyzed
34 %cc = -1:0.2:1;
35 %cc = [-0.6 0 0.6];
36 %cc = meshgrid(cc);
37 cc = [-0.6 0.6];
38 steps cc = length(cc);
39
40 %Increasing regulation
41 perc ret = (0:0.02:1)'; %percentage of retired permits
42 steps ret = length(perc ret);
43
44 %Preallocation
45 IRR = zeros(n,3,steps cc);
46 DRY = zeros(n,3,steps cc);
47
48 total water = zeros(steps cc,1);
49 total acres = zeros(steps cc,1);
50 total sd = zeros(steps cc,1);
51 wtd pump = zeros(steps cc,1);
52
53 %Tax policies
54 T ret = zeros(n,6,steps cc); %land tax
55 Z ret = zeros(n,6,steps cc); %zoning
48
56 S ret = zeros(n,6,steps cc); %SDF tax
57 W ret = zeros(n,6,steps cc); %water tax
58 P ret = zeros(n,6,steps cc); %Pigouvian tax
59
60 %Trading, 1:1
61 vol 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %volume of transacted permits (...
acres)
62 acr 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %acres retired
63 Esdr 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %expected stream depletion ...
change (mean pumping*SDF*area)
64 Asdr 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %actual stream depletion change...
(SD/ac*area)
65 dyd 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %total increase of yield (bu/ac...
* ac)
66 wat 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %average water usage at this ...
level of abatement
67 sda 11 = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %average stream depletion per ...
acre at this level of abatement
68 prc 11 = zeros(steps ret,2,steps cc); %price of permits to sellers, ...
buyers
69
70 %SDF trading: bi-directional
71 vol 2d = zeros(steps ret,2,steps cc); %volume of acres bought, volume...
of acres sold
72 acr 2d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %acres retired
73 Esdr 2d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %expected stream depletion ...
reduction (mu * SDF * area)
74 Asdr 2d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %actual stream depletion ...
reduction (SD/ac * area)
75 dyd 2d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %total decrease of yield (bu/ac...
* ac)
76 wat 2d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %average water usage per acre ...
at this level of abatement
77 sda 2d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %average stream depletion per ...
acre at this level of abatement
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78 prc 2d = zeros(steps ret,2,steps cc); %price to sellers, buyers at ...
this level of abatement
79
80 %Trading, 1d
81 vol 1d = zeros(steps ret,2,steps cc); %volume of acres bought, volume...
of acres sold
82 acr 1d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %acres retired
83 Esdr 1d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %expected stream depletion ...
reduction (mu * SDF * area)
84 Asdr 1d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %actual stream depletion ...
reduction (SD/ac * area)
85 dyd 1d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %total decrease of yield (bu/ac...
* ac)
86 wat 1d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %average water use per acre
87 sda 1d = zeros(steps ret,1,steps cc); %average stream depletion per ...
acre
88 prc 1d = zeros(steps ret,2,steps cc); %blended sellers', buyers' ...
prices
89
90
91 %Change correlation between SDF and change in yields
92 for k = 1:steps cc
93
94 %C23 = cc(k); %for SDF
95 C12 = cc(k); %for water usage
96
97 M = [V1 C12 C13 C14;
98 C12 V2 C23 C24;
99 C13 C23 V3 C34;
100 C14 C24 C34 V4 ];
101
102 % adjust correlations for uniforms
103 for i = 1:4
104 for j = max(i,2):4
105 if i 6= j
106 M(i, j) = 2 * sin(pi * M(i, j) / 6);
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107 M(j, i) = 2 * sin(pi * M(j, i) / 6);
108 end
109 end
110 end
111
112 % induce correlation, check correlations
113 C = chol(M);
114 YI = XI * C;
115 YD = XD * C;
116
117 YI(:,2:4) = normcdf(YI(:,2:4));
118 YD(:,2:4) = normcdf(YD(:,2:4));
119
120 %reorder
121 YI(:,1:4) = [YI(:,2), YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,1)];
122 YD(:,1:4) = [YD(:,2), YD(:,3), YD(:,4), YD(:,1)];
123
124 total water(k) = sum(YI(:,4).*YI(:,3));
125 total acres(k) = sum(YI(:,3));
126 total sd(k) = sum(YI(:,2).*YI(:,4).*YI(:,3));
127 wtd pump(k) = total water(k)./total acres(k);
128
129 %create YD Column 5 for SD/ac
130 YD(:,5) = YD(:,2).*YD(:,4);
131
132 %create additional columns for zoning, land tax, and SDF tax
133 YI(:,1:9) = [YI(:,1:4) YI(:,2)./YI(:,1) YI(:,1).*YI(:,3) YI(:,2).*YI...
(:,4) YI(:,2).*YI(:,4).*YI(:,3) wtd pump(k)*YI(:,2).*YI(:,3)];
134 YI(:,10) = YI(:,4)./YI(:,1);
135 YI(:,11) = YI(:,7)./YI(:,1);
136 %Column 1 is the output (yield) per unit input (irrigated acres)
137 %Column 2 is the stream depletion factor
138 %Column 3 is the normalized density (proportion of irrigated to total
139 %available land
140 %Column 4 is the irrigation use
141 %Column 5 is the ratio of SDF : change in yield
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142 %Column 6 is the total yield, yd*area
143 %Column 7 is the SD per acre = SDF*irrigation use
144 %Column 8 is the actual stream depletion, SD/ac*area
145 %Column 9 is the expected stream depletion, SDF*area*mean
146
147 IRR(:,:,k) = [YI(:,1), YI(:,2), YI(:,3)];
148 DRY(:,:,k) = [YD(:,1), YD(:,2), YD(:,3)];
149
150 %Sort sections by their selection for retirement based on policy tool
151 %T: input tax, remove lowest change in yield first
152 %Z: zoning, remove highest SDF first
153 %S: stream depletion tax, remove highest SDF/change in yd first
154 T rank = sortrows(YI,1);
155 Z rank = sortrows(YI,-2);
156 S rank = sortrows(YI,-5);
157 W rank = sortrows(YI,-10); %water tax
158 P rank = sortrows(YI,-11); %pollution tax
159
160 %Column 1 is the total reduction in yield
161 %Column 2 is the actual reduction in stream depletion, or increase in
162 %streamflow
163 %Column 3 is the total reduction in irrigated land
164 %Column 4 is the expected reduction in stream depletion
165 T ret(:,:,k) = [cumsum(T rank(:,6)) cumsum(T rank(:,8)) cumsum(T rank...
(:,3)) cumsum(T rank(:,9)) zeros(n,2)];
166 Z ret(:,:,k) = [cumsum(Z rank(:,6)) cumsum(Z rank(:,8)) cumsum(Z rank...
(:,3)) cumsum(Z rank(:,9)) zeros(n,2)];
167 S ret(:,:,k) = [cumsum(S rank(:,6)) cumsum(S rank(:,8)) cumsum(S rank...
(:,3)) cumsum(S rank(:,9)) zeros(n,2)];
168 W ret(:,:,k) = [cumsum(W rank(:,6)) cumsum(W rank(:,8)) cumsum(W rank...
(:,3)) cumsum(W rank(:,9)) zeros(n,2)];
169 P ret(:,:,k) = [cumsum(P rank(:,6)) cumsum(P rank(:,8)) cumsum(P rank...
(:,3)) cumsum(P rank(:,9)) zeros(n,2)];
170 %Column 5 is the new average water use per acre, having removed field
171 %Column 6 is the new average stream depletion per acre, having field ...
removed
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172 T ret(:,5,k) = (total water(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(T rank(:,4).*T rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(T rank(:,3)));
173 Z ret(:,5,k) = (total water(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,4).*Z rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,3)));
174 S ret(:,5,k) = (total water(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(S rank(:,4).*S rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(S rank(:,3)));
175 W ret(:,5,k) = (total water(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(W rank(:,4).*W rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(W rank(:,3)));
176 P ret(:,5,k) = (total water(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(P rank(:,4).*P rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(P rank(:,3)));
177 T ret(:,6,k) = (total sd(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(T rank(:,7).*T rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(T rank(:,3)));
178 Z ret(:,6,k) = (total sd(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,7).*Z rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,3)));
179 S ret(:,6,k) = (total sd(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(S rank(:,7).*S rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(S rank(:,3)));
180 W ret(:,6,k) = (total sd(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(W rank(:,7).*W rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(W rank(:,3)));
181 P ret(:,6,k) = (total sd(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(P rank(:,7).*P rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres(k)*ones(n,1) - cumsum(P rank(:,3)));
182
183
184 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
185 % Tradable permit systems %
186 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
187 %1:1 trading
188
189 for kk = 1:steps ret
190 ret 11 = [YI(:,1:2), perc ret(kk)*YI(:,3),YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
191 wi 11 = [YI(:,1:2), (1 - perc ret(kk))*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
192 wo 11 = [YD; ret 11];
193
194 fields irr = size(wi 11,1); %fields with irrigation rights
195 fields dry = size(wo 11,1); %fields without irrigation rights
196
197 %Preallocate and find effective bid
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198 eff bid 11 = zeros(fields irr, fields dry); %effective bid between...
each buyer and seller, weighted by SDF
199
200 for i = 1:fields irr %sellers
201 for j = 1:fields dry %buyers
202 if wo 11(j,3) > 0
203 %if there is positive acreage, there is a demand to ...
buy.
204 %otherwise, eff bid = 0.
205 eff bid 11(i,j) = max(wo 11(j,1) - wi 11(i,1),0);
206 %the difference between the yield values
207 end
208 end
209 end
210
211 [ranked 11 index 11] = sortrows(reshape(eff bid 11,[],1),-1);
212 %properties of trades
213 %(1) total increase in yields
214 %(2) expected change in SD
215 %(3) actual change in SD
216 %(4) acres sold
217 %(5) acres bought
218 %(6) increase in water usage per acre
219 %(7) increase in stream depletion per acre
220 %(8) price to seller = price to buyer for 1:1 trades
221 trades 11 = zeros(size(index 11,1),7);
222
223 %tracks acreage
224 purch 11 = zeros(fields dry,1);
225 sold 11 = zeros(fields irr,1);
226
227 for i = 1:length(index 11)
228 if ranked 11(i) > 0
229 seller index = 1 + rem(index 11(i) + fields irr - 1, ...
fields irr);
230 buyer index = ceil(index 11(i)/fields irr);
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231 %seller's constraint
232 S con 11 = (wi 11(seller index,3)-sold 11(seller index,1));
233 %buyer's constraint
234 B con 11 = (wo 11(buyer index,3)-purch 11(buyer index,1));
235 %trade max acres between constraints
236 const 11 = min([S con 11 B con 11]);
237 trades 11(i,4) = const 11;
238 trades 11(i,5) = const 11;
239 trades 11(i,6) = wo 11(buyer index,4)*trades 11(i,5) - ...
wi 11(seller index,4)*trades 11(i,4);
240 trades 11(i,7) = wo 11(buyer index,5)*trades 11(i,5) - ...
wi 11(seller index,5)*trades 11(i,4);
241 trades 11(i,8) = (wi 11(seller index,1)*trades 11(i,4) + ...
wo 11(buyer index,1)*trades 11(i,5))/(2*trades 11(i,4))...
;
242 trades 11(i,1) = wo 11(buyer index,1)*trades 11(i,5) - ...
wi 11(seller index,1)*trades 11(i,4);
243 trades 11(i,2) = wtd pump(k)*(wo 11(buyer index,2)*...
trades 11(i,5) - wi 11(seller index,2)*trades 11(i,4));
244 trades 11(i,3) = wo 11(buyer index,5)*trades 11(i,5) - ...
wi 11(seller index,5)*trades 11(i,4);
245 %update buyer
246 purch 11(buyer index,1) = purch 11(buyer index,1) + ...
trades 11(i,5);
247 %update seller
248 sold 11(seller index,1) = sold 11(seller index,1) + ...
trades 11(i,4);
249 end
250 end
251 trades 11(isnan(trades 11)) = 0;
252 %for final output
253 acr 11(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 11(:,3));
254 dyd 11(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 11(:,1).*ret 11(:,3)) - sum(trades 11(:,1)...
);
255 Esdr 11(kk,1,k) = wtd pump(k)*sum(ret 11(:,2).*ret 11(:,3)) - sum(...
trades 11(:,2));
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256 Asdr 11(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 11(:,5).*ret 11(:,3)) - sum(trades 11...
(:,3));
257 vol 11(kk,1:2,k) = sum(trades 11(:,4:5));
258 wat 11(kk,1,k) = (sum(wi 11(:,3).*wi 11(:,4)) + sum(trades 11(:,6))...
)/sum(wi 11(:,3));
259 sda 11(kk,1,k) = (sum(wi 11(:,3).*wi 11(:,5)) + sum(trades 11(:,7))...
)/sum(wi 11(:,3));
260 prc 11(kk,1,k) = sum(trades 11(:,8))/vol 11(kk,1,k);
261 end
262
263 %Bidirectional trading
264 for kk = 1:steps ret
265 ret 2d = [YI(:,1:2), perc ret(kk)*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
266 wi 2d = [YI(:,1:2), (1 - perc ret(kk))*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
267 wo 2d = [YD; ret 2d];
268
269 fields irr = size(wi 2d,1);
270 fields dry = size(wo 2d,1);
271
272 %Preallocate and find effective bid
273 eff bid 2d = zeros(fields irr, fields dry); %effective bid between...
each buyer and seller, weighted by SDF
274
275 for i = 1:fields irr %sellers
276 for j = 1:fields dry %buyers
277 if wo 2d(j,3) > 0
278 %if there is positive acreage, there is a demand to ...
buy.
279 %otherwise, eff bid = 0.
280 eff bid 2d(i,j) = max(wo 2d(j,1) - wi 2d(i,1)*wo 2d(j...
,2)/wi 2d(i,2),0);
281 %related by y = mx + b, where m is the seller's sdf/yd,...
b is the
282 %y-intercept for the buyer using that seller's sdf/yd. ...
then set y =
283 %0 and solve for x, the effective bid.
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284 end
285 end
286 end
287
288 [ranked 2d index 2d] = sortrows(reshape(eff bid 2d,[],1),-1);
289 %properties of trades
290 %(1) total increase in yields
291 %(2) expected change in SD
292 %(3) actual change in SD
293 %(4) acres sold
294 %(5) acres bought
295 %(6) for looking at water usage per acre
296 %(7) for looking at stream depletion per acre
297 %(8) seller's price * sold acres
298 %(9) buyer's price * purchased acres
299 trades 2d = zeros(size(index 2d,1),9);
300
301 %tracks acreage
302 purch 2d = zeros(fields dry,1);
303 sold 2d = zeros(fields irr,1);
304
305 for i = 1:length(index 2d)
306 if ranked 2d(i) > 0
307 seller index = 1 + rem(index 2d(i) + fields irr - 1, ...
fields irr);
308 buyer index = ceil(index 2d(i)/fields irr);
309 %seller's constraint
310 S con = (wi 2d(seller index,3)-sold 2d(seller index,1))*...
wi 2d(seller index,2);
311 %buyer's constraint
312 B con = (wo 2d(buyer index,3)-purch 2d(buyer index,1))*...
wo 2d(buyer index,2);
313 %trade max acres between constraints
314 [const 2d IX] = min([S con B con]);
315 if IX == 1
316 %S con binds
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317 trades 2d(i,4) = wi 2d(seller index,3)-sold 2d(...
seller index,1);
318 trades 2d(i,5) = const 2d/wo 2d(buyer index,2);
319 else
320 %B con binds
321 trades 2d(i,4) = const 2d/wi 2d(seller index,2);
322 trades 2d(i,5) = wo 2d(buyer index,3)-purch 2d(...
buyer index,1);
323 end
324 trades 2d(i,6) = wo 2d(buyer index,4)*trades 2d(i,5) - ...
wi 2d(seller index,4)*trades 2d(i,4);
325 trades 2d(i,7) = wo 2d(buyer index,5)*trades 2d(i,5) - ...
wi 2d(seller index,5)*trades 2d(i,4);
326 trades 2d(i,8) = (wi 2d(seller index,1)*trades 2d(i,4) + ...
wo 2d(buyer index,1)*trades 2d(i,5))/(2*trades 2d(i,4))...
;
327 trades 2d(i,9) = (wi 2d(seller index,1)*trades 2d(i,4) + ...
wo 2d(buyer index,1)*trades 2d(i,5))/(2*trades 2d(i,5))...
;
328 trades 2d(i,1) = wo 2d(buyer index,1)*trades 2d(i,5) - ...
wi 2d(seller index,1)*trades 2d(i,4);
329 trades 2d(i,2) = wtd pump(k)*(wo 2d(buyer index,2)*...
trades 2d(i,5) - wi 2d(seller index,2)*trades 2d(i,4));
330 trades 2d(i,3) = wo 2d(buyer index,5)*trades 2d(i,5) - ...
wi 2d(seller index,5)*trades 2d(i,4);
331 %update buyer
332 purch 2d(buyer index,1) = purch 2d(buyer index,1) + ...
trades 2d(i,5);
333 %update seller
334 sold 2d(seller index,1) = sold 2d(seller index,1) + ...
trades 2d(i,4);
335 end
336 end
337 trades 2d(isnan(trades 2d)) = 0;
338 %for final output
339 acr 2d(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 2d(:,3));
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340 dyd 2d(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 2d(:,1).*ret 2d(:,3)) - sum(trades 2d(:,1)...
);
341 Esdr 2d(kk,1,k) = wtd pump(k)*sum(ret 2d(:,2).*ret 2d(:,3)) - sum(...
trades 2d(:,2));
342 Asdr 2d(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 2d(:,5).*ret 2d(:,3)) - sum(trades 2d...
(:,3));
343 vol 2d(kk,1:2,k) = sum(trades 2d(:,4:5));
344 wat 2d(kk,1,k) = (sum(wi 2d(:,3).*wi 2d(:,4)) + sum(trades 2d(:,6))...
)/(sum(wi 2d(:,3)) + sum(trades 2d(:,5)) - sum(trades 2d(:,4)))...
;
345 sda 2d(kk,1,k) = (sum(wi 2d(:,3).*wi 2d(:,5)) + sum(trades 2d(:,7))...
)/(sum(wi 2d(:,3)) + sum(trades 2d(:,5)) - sum(trades 2d(:,4)))...
;
346 prc 2d(kk,1:2,k) = [sum(trades 2d(:,8))/vol 2d(kk,1,k), sum(...
trades 2d(:,9))/vol 2d(kk,2,k)];
347 end
348
349 %Unidirectional trading
350 for kk = 1:steps ret
351 ret 1d = [YI(:,1:2), perc ret(kk)*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
352 wi 1d = [YI(:,1:2), (1 - perc ret(kk))*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
353 wo 1d = [YD; ret 1d];
354
355 fields irr = size(wi 1d,1);
356 fields dry = size(wo 1d,1);
357
358 %Preallocate and find effective bid
359 eff bid 1d = zeros(fields irr,fields dry); %effective bid ...
between each buyer and seller, weighted by SDF
360 bid type = zeros(fields irr,fields dry); %zero for 1:1 trade, ...
1 if discounted
361
362 for i = 1:fields irr %sellers
363 for j = 1:fields dry %buyers
364 if wo 1d(j,3) > 0
59
365 %if there is positive acreage, there is a demand to ...
buy.
366 %otherwise, eff bid = 0.
367 if wi 1d(i,2) ≥ wo 1d(j,2)
368 %SDF of seller is less than SDF of buyer, 1:1 trade
369 eff bid 1d(i,j) = max(0, wo 1d(j,1) - wi 1d(i,1));
370 else
371 bid type(i,j) = 1;
372 eff bid 1d(i,j) = max(wo 1d(j,1) - wi 1d(i,1)*wo 1d...
(j,2)/wi 1d(i,2),0);
373 %related by y = mx + b, where m is the seller's sdf...
/yd, b is the
374 %y-intercept for the buyer using that seller's sdf/...
yd. then set y =
375 %0 and solve for x, the effective bid.
376 end
377 end
378 end
379 end
380
381 [ranked 1d index 1d] = sortrows(reshape(eff bid 1d,[],1),-1);
382 %properties of trades
383 %(1) total increase in yields
384 %(2) expected change in SD
385 %(3) actual change in SD
386 %(4) acres sold
387 %(5) acres bought
388 %(6) for checking water use per acre
389 %(7) for checking stream depletion per acre
390 %(8) seller's price * sold acres
391 %(9) buyer's price * purchased acres
392 trades 1d = zeros(size(index 1d,1),9);
393
394 %tracks acreage
395 purch 1d = zeros(fields dry,1);
396 sold 1d = zeros(fields irr,1);
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397
398 for i = 1:length(index 1d)
399 if ranked 1d(i) > 0
400 buyer index = ceil(index 1d(i)/fields irr);
401 seller index = 1 + rem(index 1d(i) + fields irr - 1, ...
fields irr);
402 if bid type(index 1d(i)) == 0
403 %seller's constraint
404 S con 1d = (wi 1d(seller index,3)-sold 1d(seller index...
,1));
405 %buyer's constraint
406 B con 1d = (wo 1d(buyer index,3)-purch 1d(buyer index...
,1));
407 const 1d = min([S con 1d B con 1d]);
408 trades 1d(i,4) = const 1d;
409 trades 1d(i,5) = const 1d;
410 else
411 %seller's constraint
412 S con 1d = (wi 1d(seller index,3)-sold 1d(seller index...
,1))*wi 1d(seller index,2);
413 %buyer's constraint
414 B con 1d = (wo 1d(buyer index,3)-purch 1d(buyer index...
,1))*wo 1d(buyer index,2);
415 %trade max acres between constraints
416 [const 1d IX] = min([S con 1d B con 1d]);
417 if IX == 1
418 %S con binds
419 trades 1d(i,4) = wi 1d(seller index,3)-sold 1d(...
seller index,1);
420 trades 1d(i,5) = const 1d/wo 1d(buyer index,2);
421 else
422 %B con binds
423 trades 1d(i,4) = const 1d/wi 1d(seller index,2);
424 trades 1d(i,5) = wo 1d(buyer index,3)-purch 1d(...
buyer index,1);
425 end
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426 end
427 trades 1d(i,6) = wo 1d(buyer index,4)*trades 1d(i,5) - ...
wi 1d(seller index,4)*trades 1d(i,4);
428 trades 1d(i,7) = wo 1d(buyer index,5)*trades 1d(i,5) - ...
wi 1d(seller index,5)*trades 1d(i,4);
429 trades 1d(i,8) = (wi 1d(seller index,1)*trades 1d(i,4) + ...
wo 1d(buyer index,1)*trades 1d(i,5))/(2*trades 1d(i,4))...
;
430 trades 1d(i,9) = (wi 1d(seller index,1)*trades 1d(i,4) + ...
wo 1d(buyer index,1)*trades 1d(i,5))/(2*trades 1d(i,5))...
;
431 trades 1d(i,1) = wo 1d(buyer index,1)*trades 1d(i,5) - ...
wi 1d(seller index,1)*trades 1d(i,4);
432 trades 1d(i,2) = wtd pump(k)*(wo 1d(buyer index,2)*...
trades 1d(i,5) - wi 1d(seller index,2)*trades 1d(i,4));
433 trades 1d(i,3) = wo 1d(buyer index,5)*trades 1d(i,5) - ...
wi 1d(seller index,5)*trades 1d(i,4);
434 %update buyer
435 purch 1d(buyer index,1) = purch 1d(buyer index,1) + ...
trades 1d(i,5);
436 %update seller
437 sold 1d(seller index,1) = sold 1d(seller index,1) + ...
trades 1d(i,4);
438 end
439 end
440 trades 1d(isnan(trades 1d)) = 0;
441 %for final output
442 acr 1d(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 1d(:,3));
443 dyd 1d(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 1d(:,1).*ret 1d(:,3)) - sum(trades 1d(:,1)...
);
444 Esdr 1d(kk,1,k) = wtd pump(k)*sum(ret 1d(:,2).*ret 1d(:,3)) - sum(...
trades 1d(:,2));
445 Asdr 1d(kk,1,k) = sum(ret 1d(:,5).*ret 1d(:,3)) - sum(trades 1d...
(:,3));
446 vol 1d(kk,1:2,k) = sum(trades 1d(:,4:5));
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447 wat 1d(kk,1,k) = (sum(wi 1d(:,3).*wi 1d(:,4)) + sum(trades 1d(:,6))...
)/(sum(wi 1d(:,3)) + sum(trades 1d(:,5)) - sum(trades 1d(:,4)))...
;
448 sda 1d(kk,1,k) = (sum(wi 1d(:,3).*wi 1d(:,5)) + sum(trades 1d(:,7))...
)/(sum(wi 1d(:,3)) + sum(trades 1d(:,5)) - sum(trades 1d(:,4)))...
;
449 prc 1d(kk,1:2,k) = [sum(trades 1d(:,8))/vol 1d(kk,1,k), sum(...
trades 1d(:,9))/vol 1d(kk,2,k)];
450 end
451
452 end
453
454 toc
455
456 set(0,'DefaultAxesLineStyleOrder','-|--|-.')
457 set(0,'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[0 0 0])
458
459 for k = 1:steps cc
460 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
461 %Irrigated/ Dryland Properties%
462 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
463 formspec1 = 'rand ext properties%d';
464 fnam1 = sprintf(formspec1,k);
465 h1 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], '...
Visible', 'off');
466 subplot(1,2,1);
467 scatter(IRR(:,1,k),IRR(:,2,k),IRR(:,3,k)*50,'k','LineWidth',2)
468 %axis([0 1 0 1])
469 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
470 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Transfer function')
471 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Marginal value')
472 title({'\fontsize{28} Damaging Firms',['\fontsize{14} Corr(\piˆ\nu, \...
gamma) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
473 subplot(1,2,2)
474 scatter(DRY(:,1,k),DRY(:,2,k),DRY(:,3,k)*50,'k','LineWidth',2)
475 %axis([0 1 0 1])
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476 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
477 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Transfer function')
478 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Marginal value')
479 title({'\fontsize{28} Non-Damaging Firms',['\fontsize{14} Corr(\piˆ\nu,...
\gamma) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
480 print(h1,fnam1,'-depsc')
481
482 formspec1 = 'rand ext2 properties%d';
483 fnam1 = sprintf(formspec1,k);
484 h1 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], '...
Visible', 'off');
485 subplot(1,2,1);
486 scatter(IRR(:,1,k),mean(IRR(:,2,k)).*IRR(:,2,k),IRR(:,3,k)*50,'k','...
LineWidth',2)
487 %axis([0 1 0 1])
488 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
489 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Expected marginal externality')
490 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Marginal value')
491 title({'\fontsize{28} Damaging Firms',['\fontsize{14} Corr(\piˆ\nu, \...
gamma) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
492 subplot(1,2,2)
493 scatter(DRY(:,1,k),mean(DRY(:,2,k)).*DRY(:,2,k),DRY(:,3,k)*50,'k','...
LineWidth',2)
494 %axis([0 1 0 1])
495 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
496 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Expected marginal externality')
497 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Marginal value')
498 title({'\fontsize{28} Non-Damaging Firms',['\fontsize{14} Corr(\piˆ\nu,...
\gamma) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
499 print(h1,fnam1,'-depsc')
500 end
501
502 for k = 1:steps cc
503 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
504 %Another policy comparison, w/o extras%
505 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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506 formspec1 = 'rand ext micro%d';
507 fnam1 = sprintf(formspec1,k);
508 h1 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], '...
Visible', 'off');
509 r1 = plot(T ret(1:8:end,2,k),T ret(1:8:end,1,k),'--x',S ret(:,2,k),...
S ret(:,1,k),':',Z ret(1:10:end,2,k),Z ret(1:10:end,1,k),'--o',...
P ret(:,2,k),P ret(:,1,k),'-',Asdr 11(1:4:end,:,k),dyd 11(1:4:end...
,:,k),'-.s',Asdr 1d(:,:,k),dyd 1d(:,:,k),'-.',Asdr 2d(:,:,k),dyd 2d...
(:,:,k),'--');
510 r2 = legend('Land tax','Transfer function tax','Zoning','Marg. ...
externality tax','Trading, one-to-one','Trading, unidirectional','...
Trading, bidirectional','Location','Northwest');
511 set(r1,'LineWidth',2)
512 set(r2,'FontSize',16)
513 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
514 title({'\fontsize{28} Comparison of Policies to Reduce the Externality'...
,['\fontsize{14} Corr(\piˆ\nu, \gamma) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
515 %axis([-10 70 -100 160])
516 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Total abatement') %abatement
517 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Total reduction of profits') %costs
518 print(h1,fnam1,'-depsc')
519
520 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
521 %Irrigated land and streamflow%
522 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
523 formspec3 = 'rand ext area%d';
524 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec3,k);
525 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], '...
Visible', 'off');
526 r1 = plot(T ret(1:8:end,3,k),T ret(1:8:end,2,k),'--x',S ret(:,3,k),...
S ret(:,2,k),':',Z ret(1:10:end,3,k),Z ret(1:10:end,2,k),'--o',...
P ret(:,3,k),P ret(:,2,k),'-',acr 11(1:4:end,:,k),Asdr 11(1:4:end...
,:,k),'-.s',acr 1d(:,:,k),Asdr 1d(:,:,k),'-.',acr 2d(:,:,k),Asdr 2d...
(:,:,k),'--');
527 r2 = legend('Land tax','Transfer function tax','Zoning','Marg. ...
externality tax','Trading, one-to-one','Trading, unidirectional','...
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Trading, bidirectional','Location','Northwest');
528 set(r1,'LineWidth',2)
529 set(r2,'FontSize',16)
530 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
531 title({'\fontsize{28} Reduction of the Externality with Industry Size'...
,['\fontsize{14} Corr(\piˆ\nu, \gamma) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
532 xlim([0 max(total acres)])
533 %axis([0 total acres -10 70])
534 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Total reduction of industry size') %permits ...
retired
535 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Total abatement') %abatement
536 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
537 end
538
539 %%%%for correlations between water and productivity
540 for k = 1:steps cc
541 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
542 %Another policy comparison, w/o extras%
543 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
544 formspec1 = 'rand input micro%d';
545 fnam1 = sprintf(formspec1,k);
546 h1 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], '...
Visible', 'off');
547 r1 = plot(T ret(1:8:end,2,k),T ret(1:8:end,1,k),'--x',S ret(:,2,k),...
S ret(:,1,k),':',Z ret(1:10:end,2,k),Z ret(1:10:end,1,k),'--o',...
P ret(:,2,k),P ret(:,1,k),'-',Asdr 11(1:4:end,:,k),dyd 11(1:4:end...
,:,k),'-.s',Asdr 1d(:,:,k),dyd 1d(:,:,k),'-.',Asdr 2d(:,:,k),dyd 2d...
(:,:,k),'--');
548 r2 = legend('Land tax','Transfer function tax','Zoning','Marg. ...
externality tax','Trading, one-to-one','Trading, unidirectional','...
Trading, bidirectional','Location','Northwest');
549 set(r1,'LineWidth',2)
550 set(r2,'FontSize',16)
551 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
552 title({'\fontsize{28} Comparison of Policies to Reduce the Externality'...
,['\fontsize{20} Corr(\piˆ\nu, w) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
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553 %axis([-10 70 -100 160])
554 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Total abatement') %abatement
555 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Total reduction of profits') %costs
556 print(h1,fnam1,'-depsc')
557
558 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
559 %Irrigated land and streamflow%
560 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
561 formspec3 = 'rand input area%d';
562 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec3,k);
563 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], '...
Visible', 'off');
564 r1 = plot(T ret(1:8:end,3,k),T ret(1:8:end,2,k),'--x',S ret(:,3,k),...
S ret(:,2,k),':',Z ret(1:10:end,3,k),Z ret(1:10:end,2,k),'--o',...
P ret(:,3,k),P ret(:,2,k),'-',acr 11(1:4:end,:,k),Asdr 11(1:4:end...
,:,k),'-.s',acr 1d(:,:,k),Asdr 1d(:,:,k),'-.',acr 2d(:,:,k),Asdr 2d...
(:,:,k),'--');
565 r2 = legend('Land tax','Transfer function tax','Zoning','Marg. ...
externality tax','Trading, one-to-one','Trading, unidirectional','...
Trading, bidirectional','Location','Northwest');
566 set(r1,'LineWidth',2)
567 set(r2,'FontSize',16)
568 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
569 title({'\fontsize{28} Reduction of the Externality with Industry Size'...
,['\fontsize{20} Corr(\piˆ\nu, w) = ',num2str(cc(k))]})
570 xlim([0 max(total acres)])
571 %axis([0 total acres -10 70])
572 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Total reduction of industry size') %permits ...
retired
573 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Total abatement') %abatement
574 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
575 end
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Twin Platte NRD Simulation
Preprocessing of Data
1 %Preprocessing of TPNRD data for microparameter model
2 %Written by Richael K. Young
3 clear all
4
5 %Bring in the slope statistics
6 fid1 = fopen('Slope Stats.csv');
7 slopes cell = textscan(fid1,...
8 '%f %*f %*d %*d %f %f %f %f %f %*f', 'delimiter',',','HeaderLines',1);
9 %(1) id, area, count, area, (2) min, (3) max, (4) range, (5) mean,
10 %(6) st dev, sum
11 fclose(fid1);
12
13 slopes = cell2mat(slopes cell(1:6));
14 n slopes = length(slopes);
15
16 % %Bring in the certified irrigated acres
17 % fid2 = fopen('CIA-by-Section.csv');
18 % Y cell = textscan(fid2,...
19 % '%f %f', 'delimiter',',','HeaderLines',1);
20 % %(1) id, (2) area (ac)
21 % fclose(fid2);
22 %
23 % Y = cell2mat(Y cell(1:2));
24
25 %Bring in the big-time data
26 fid2 = fopen('Sections DRYIRR.csv');
27 sections cell = textscan(fid2,...
28 '%f %*f %*f %*f %*f %f %*f %f %f %*f %f %f %f', 'delimiter',',','...
HeaderLines',1);
29 %(1) id, x co, y co, pi irr, pi dry, (2) mv irr, total area,
68
30 %(3) max irr area, (4) ac irr (currently), ac dry (currently),
31 %(5) irr in (corn), (6) sdf, (7)sd/ac
32 fclose(fid2);
33
34 sections = cell2mat(sections cell);
35 n sections = length(sections);
36 sections(:,8) = zeros(n sections,1);
37
38 clear slopes cell sections cell fid1 fid2
39
40
41 %Match the files
42 for i=1:n sections
43 ind slopes = find(slopes(:,1) == i);
44 ind sections = find(sections(:,1) == i);
45 if ind slopes == ind sections
46 sections(ind sections,8) = slopes(ind slopes,3);
47 end
48 end
49
50
51 %Drop sections with slopes > 10% [optional: AND no CIA (grandfathered)]
52 %sections rem = find(sections(:,8) > 10 & sections(:,4) == 0);
53 sections rem = find(sections(:,8) > 10);
54 sections slope = removerows(sections,'ind',sections rem);
55 sum(sections slope(:,4))
56
57 sections final = sections slope(:,1:7);
58 csvwrite('SECTIONS FINAL.csv',sections final);
59 %(1) id, (2) mv irr, (3) max irr area, (4) ac irr, (5) irr in, corn,
60 %(6) sdf, (7) sd/ac
Simulation
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1 %Comparing policies in a microparameter framework
2 %Policies include zoning, SDF tax, depletion tax, 1:1 trading, bi-...
directional
3 %trading, and uni-directional trading
4 %Written by Richael K. Young, December 2013
5 %Last modified February 2014
6
7 clear all
8 close all force
9 close all hidden
10
11 %fid1=fopen('TPNRD microparameter input.csv');
12 fid1 = fopen('Sections FINAL.csv');
13 X cell = textscan(fid1,...
14 '%*d %f %f %f %f %f %f', 'delimiter',',','HeaderLines',1);
15 %(*) id, (1) mv irr, (2) max irr area, (3) ac irr (currently),
16 %(4) irr in (corn), (5) sdf, (6) sd/ac
17 fclose(fid1);
18
19 X = cell2mat(X cell(1:6));
20 X(:,7) = X(:,2) - X(:,3); %max irrigated area demanded (currently dry)
21
22 %Reorder, separate irrigated and dryland fields:
23 %Column 1 is the output (yield) per unit input (irrigated acres)
24 %Column 2 is the stream depletion factor
25 %Column 3 is the land area
26 %Column 4 is the irrigation requirement
27 %Column 5 is the stream depletion per acre
28 XI = [X(:,1) X(:,5) X(:,3) X(:,4) X(:,6)];
29 XI rem = find(XI(:,3)≤0);
30 XI = removerows(XI,'ind',XI rem);
31 XD = [X(:,1) X(:,5) X(:,7) X(:,4) X(:,6)];
32 XD rem = find(XD(:,3)≤0);
33 XD = removerows(XD,'ind',XD rem);
34
35 XR = [X(:,1) X(:,5) X(:,7) X(:,4) X(:,6) X(:,3)];
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36 XR rem = find(XR(:,6)>0);
37 XR = removerows(XR,'ind',XR rem);
38 XR rem = find(XR(:,3)≤0);
39 XR = removerows(XR,'ind',XR rem);
40 XR(isnan(XR)) = 0;
41
42 clear X cell fid1 XI rem XD rem XR rem
43
44 %Aggregate water usage, land, stream depletion + expected seasonal pumping
45 total water = sum(XI(:,4).*XI(:,3)); %sum(water use*irr acres)
46 total acres = sum(XI(:,3)); %sum(irr acres)
47 total sd = sum(XI(:,5).*XI(:,3)); %sum(SD/ac*irr acres)
48 wtd pump = total water/total acres; %total water extracted/ total area ...
irrigated
49
50 YI = [XI(:,1:4), XI(:,2)./XI(:,1), XI(:,1).*XI(:,3), XI(:,5), XI(:,5).*XI...
(:,3), XI(:,2).*XI(:,3)*wtd pump];
51 YI(:,10) = YI(:,4)./YI(:,1);
52 YI(:,11) = YI(:,7)./YI(:,1);
53 YI(isnan(YI)) = 0; %replace NaN with 0
54 %Column 5 is the ratio of stream depletion : change in yield
55 %Column 6 is the total margianl profit, profit*area
56 %Column 7 is the stream depletion per acre, SD/ac
57 %Column 8 is the actual stream depletion, SD/ac * area
58 %Column 9 is the expected stream depletion, SDF * area * exp pump
59 %Column 10 is water use per acre per change in yield
60 %Column 11 is stream depletion per acre per change in yield
61
62 YD = XD(:,1:5);
63 YD(isnan(YD)) = 0; %replace NaN with 0
64
65 %Sort sections by their selection for retirement based on policy tool
66 %T: input tax, remove lowest change in yield first
67 %Z: zoning, remove highest SDF first
68 %S: stream depletion tax, remove highest SDF/change in yd first
69 T rank = sortrows(YI,1);
71
70 Z rank = sortrows(YI,-2);
71 S rank = sortrows(YI,-5);
72 W rank = sortrows(YI,-10); %water tax
73 P rank = sortrows(YI,-11); %pollution tax
74
75 %Column 1 is the total reduction in profit
76 %Column 2 is the actual reduction in stream depletion, or increase in
77 %streamflow
78 %Column 3 is the total reduction in irrigated land
79 %Column 4 is the expected reduction in stream depletion -- this assumes
80 %that the SDF is known, which for the land tax is not
81 %Column 5 is the average water use district-wide
82 %Column 6 is the average stream depletion district-wide
83 T ret = [cumsum(T rank(:,6)) cumsum(T rank(:,8)) cumsum(T rank(:,3)) cumsum...
(T rank(:,9)) zeros(size(YI,1),1)];
84 Z ret = [cumsum(Z rank(:,6)) cumsum(Z rank(:,8)) cumsum(Z rank(:,3)) cumsum...
(Z rank(:,9)) zeros(size(YI,1),1)];
85 S ret = [cumsum(S rank(:,6)) cumsum(S rank(:,8)) cumsum(S rank(:,3)) cumsum...
(S rank(:,9)) zeros(size(YI,1),1)];
86 W ret = [cumsum(W rank(:,6)) cumsum(W rank(:,8)) cumsum(W rank(:,3)) cumsum...
(W rank(:,9)) zeros(size(YI,1),2)];
87 P ret = [cumsum(P rank(:,6)) cumsum(P rank(:,8)) cumsum(P rank(:,3)) cumsum...
(P rank(:,9)) zeros(size(YI,1),2)];
88 T ret(:,5) = (total water*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(T rank(:,4).*T rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(T rank(:,3)));
89 Z ret(:,5) = (total water*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,4).*Z rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,3)));
90 S ret(:,5) = (total water*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(S rank(:,4).*S rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(S rank(:,3)));
91 W ret(:,5) = (total water*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(W rank(:,4).*W rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(W rank(:,3)));
92 P ret(:,5) = (total water*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(P rank(:,4).*P rank...
(:,3)))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(P rank(:,3)));
93 T ret(:,6) = (total sd*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(T rank(:,7).*T rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(T rank(:,3)));
72
94 Z ret(:,6) = (total sd*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,7).*Z rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(Z rank(:,3)));
95 S ret(:,6) = (total sd*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(S rank(:,7).*S rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(S rank(:,3)));
96 W ret(:,6) = (total sd*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(W rank(:,7).*W rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(W rank(:,3)));
97 P ret(:,6) = (total sd*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(P rank(:,7).*P rank(:,3)...
))./(total acres*ones(size(YI,1),1) - cumsum(P rank(:,3)));
98
99
100 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
101 % Trading scenarios w/ increasing regulation %
102 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
103 perc ret = (0:0.01:1)'; %percentage of retired permits
104 steps ret = length(perc ret);
105
106 %Trading, 1:1
107 tic
108 vol 11 = zeros(steps ret,1); %volume of transacted permits (acres)
109 acr 11 = zeros(steps ret,1); %acres retired
110 Esdr 11 = zeros(steps ret,1); %expected stream depletion change (SDF * area...
)
111 Asdr 11 = zeros(steps ret,1); %actual stream depletion change (SD/ac * area...
)
112 dyd 11 = zeros(steps ret,1); %total increase of yield (bu/ac * ac)
113 wat 11 = zeros(steps ret,1);
114 sda 11 = zeros(steps ret,1);
115
116 for kk = 1:steps ret
117 ret 11 = [YI(:,1:2), perc ret(kk)*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
118 wi 11 = [YI(:,1:2), (1 - perc ret(kk))*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
119 wo 11 = [YD; ret 11];
120
121 fields irr = size(wi 11,1);
122 fields dry = size(wo 11,1);
123
73
124 %Preallocate and find effective bid
125 eff bid 11 = zeros(fields irr,fields dry); %effective bid between each...
buyer and seller, weighted by SDF
126
127 for i = 1:fields irr %sellers
128 for j = 1:fields dry %buyers
129 if wo 11(j,3) > 0
130 %if there is positive acreage, there is a demand to buy.
131 %otherwise, eff bid = 0.
132 eff bid 11(i,j) = max(wo 11(j,1) - wi 11(i,1),0);
133 %the difference between the yield values
134 end
135 end
136 end
137
138 [ranked 11 index 11] = sortrows(reshape(eff bid 11,[],1),-1);
139 %properties of trades
140 %(1) total increase in yields
141 %(2) expected change in SD
142 %(3) actual change in SD
143 %(4) acres sold
144 %(5) acres bought
145 %(6) to track change in avg water use
146 trades 11 = zeros(size(index 11,1),7);
147
148 %tracks acreage
149 purch 11 = zeros(fields dry,1);
150 sold 11 = zeros(fields irr,1);
151
152 for i = 1:length(index 11)
153 if ranked 11(i) > 0
154 seller index = 1 + rem(index 11(i) + fields irr - 1, fields irr...
);
155 buyer index = ceil(index 11(i)/fields irr);
156 %seller's constraint
157 S con 11 = (wi 11(seller index,3)-sold 11(seller index,1));
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158 %buyer's constraint
159 B con 11 = (wo 11(buyer index,3)-purch 11(buyer index,1));
160 %trade max acres between constraints
161 const 11 = min([S con 11 B con 11]);
162 trades 11(i,4) = const 11;
163 trades 11(i,5) = const 11;
164 trades 11(i,6) = wo 11(buyer index,4)*trades 11(i,5) - wi 11(...
seller index,4)*trades 11(i,4);
165 trades 11(i,7) = wo 11(buyer index,5)*trades 11(i,5) - wi 11(...
seller index,5)*trades 11(i,4);
166 trades 11(i,1) = wo 11(buyer index,1)*trades 11(i,5) - wi 11(...
seller index,1)*trades 11(i,4);
167 trades 11(i,2) = wo 11(buyer index,2)*trades 11(i,5) - wi 11(...
seller index,2)*trades 11(i,4);
168 trades 11(i,3) = wo 11(buyer index,5)*trades 11(i,5) - wi 11(...
seller index,5)*trades 11(i,4);
169 %update buyer
170 purch 11(buyer index,1) = purch 11(buyer index,1) + trades 11(i...
,5);
171 %update seller
172 sold 11(seller index,1) = sold 11(seller index,1) + trades 11(i...
,4);
173 end
174 end
175 %for final output
176 acr 11(kk,1) = sum(ret 11(:,3));
177 dyd 11(kk,1) = sum(ret 11(:,1).*ret 11(:,3)) - sum(trades 11(:,1));
178 Esdr 11(kk,1) = wtd pump*(sum(ret 11(:,2).*ret 11(:,3)) - sum(trades 11...
(:,2)));
179 Asdr 11(kk,1) = sum(ret 11(:,5).*ret 11(:,3)) - sum(trades 11(:,3));
180 vol 11(kk,1:2) = sum(trades 11(:,4:5));
181 wat 11(kk,1) = (sum(wi 11(:,3).*wi 11(:,4)) + sum(trades 11(:,6)))/sum(...
wi 11(:,3));
182 sda 11(kk,1) = (sum(wi 11(:,3).*wi 11(:,5)) + sum(trades 11(:,7)))/sum(...
wi 11(:,3));
183 end
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184 toc
185
186 %SDF trading: bi-directional
187 tic
188 vol 2d = zeros(steps ret,2); %volume of acres bought, volume of acres sold
189 acr 2d = zeros(steps ret,1); %acres retired
190 Esdr 2d = zeros(steps ret,1); %expected stream depletion reduction (SDF * ...
area)
191 Asdr 2d = zeros(steps ret,1); %actual stream depletion reduction (SD/ac * ...
area)
192 dyd 2d = zeros(steps ret,1); %total decrease of yield (bu/ac * ac)
193 wat 2d = zeros(steps ret,1);
194 sda 2d = zeros(steps ret,1);
195
196 for kk = 1:steps ret
197 ret 2d = [YI(:,1:2), perc ret(kk)*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
198 wi 2d = [YI(:,1:2), (1 - perc ret(kk))*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
199 wo 2d = [YD; ret 2d];
200
201 fields irr = size(wi 2d,1);
202 fields dry = size(wo 2d,1);
203
204 %Preallocate and find effective bid
205 eff bid 2d = zeros(fields irr,fields dry); %effective bid between each...
buyer and seller, weighted by SDF
206
207 for i = 1:fields irr %sellers
208 for j = 1:fields dry %buyers
209 if wo 2d(j,3) > 0
210 %if there is positive acreage, there is a demand to buy.
211 %otherwise, eff bid = 0.
212 eff bid 2d(i,j) = max(wo 2d(j,1) - wi 2d(i,1)*wo 2d(j,2)/...
wi 2d(i,2),0);
213 %related by y = mx + b, where m is the seller's sdf/yd, b ...
is the
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214 %y-intercept for the buyer using that seller's sdf/yd. then...
set y =
215 %0 and solve for x, the effective bid.
216 end
217 end
218 end
219
220 [ranked 2d index 2d] = sortrows(reshape(eff bid 2d,[],1),-1);
221 %properties of trades
222 %(1) total increase in yields
223 %(2) expected change in SD
224 %(3) actual change in SD
225 %(4) acres sold
226 %(5) acres bought
227 trades 2d = zeros(size(index 2d,1),7);
228
229 %tracks acreage
230 purch 2d = zeros(fields dry,1);
231 sold 2d = zeros(fields irr,1);
232
233 for i = 1:length(index 2d)
234 if ranked 2d(i) > 0
235 seller index = 1 + rem(index 2d(i) + fields irr - 1, fields irr...
);
236 buyer index = ceil(index 2d(i)/fields irr);
237 %seller's constraint
238 S con = (wi 2d(seller index,3)-sold 2d(seller index,1))*wi 2d(...
seller index,2);
239 %buyer's constraint
240 B con = (wo 2d(buyer index,3)-purch 2d(buyer index,1))*wo 2d(...
buyer index,2);
241 %trade max acres between constraints
242 [const 2d IX] = min([S con B con]);
243 if IX == 1
244 %S con binds
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245 trades 2d(i,4) = wi 2d(seller index,3)-sold 2d(seller index...
,1);
246 trades 2d(i,5) = const 2d/wo 2d(buyer index,2);
247 else
248 %B con binds
249 trades 2d(i,4) = const 2d/wi 2d(seller index,2);
250 trades 2d(i,5) = wo 2d(buyer index,3)-purch 2d(buyer index...
,1);
251 end
252 trades 2d(i,6) = wo 2d(buyer index,4)*trades 2d(i,5) - wi 2d(...
seller index,4)*trades 2d(i,4);
253 trades 2d(i,7) = wo 2d(buyer index,5)*trades 2d(i,5) - wi 2d(...
seller index,5)*trades 2d(i,4);
254 trades 2d(i,1) = wo 2d(buyer index,1)*trades 2d(i,5) - wi 2d(...
seller index,1)*trades 2d(i,4);
255 trades 2d(i,2) = wo 2d(buyer index,2)*trades 2d(i,5) - wi 2d(...
seller index,2)*trades 2d(i,4);
256 trades 2d(i,3) = wo 2d(buyer index,5)*trades 2d(i,5) - wi 2d(...
seller index,5)*trades 2d(i,4);
257 %update buyer
258 purch 2d(buyer index,1) = purch 2d(buyer index,1) + trades 2d(i...
,5);
259 %update seller
260 sold 2d(seller index,1) = sold 2d(seller index,1) + trades 2d(i...
,4);
261 end
262 end
263 %for final output
264 acr 2d(kk,1) = sum(ret 2d(:,3));
265 dyd 2d(kk,1) = sum(ret 2d(:,1).*ret 2d(:,3)) - sum(trades 2d(:,1));
266 Esdr 2d(kk,1) = wtd pump*(sum(ret 2d(:,2).*ret 2d(:,3)) - sum(trades 2d...
(:,2)));
267 Asdr 2d(kk,1) = sum(ret 2d(:,5).*ret 2d(:,3)) - sum(trades 2d(:,3));
268 vol 2d(kk,1:2) = sum(trades 2d(:,4:5));
269 wat 2d(kk,1) = (sum(wi 2d(:,3).*wi 2d(:,4)) + sum(trades 2d(:,6)))/(sum...
(wi 2d(:,3)) + sum(trades 2d(:,5)) - sum(trades 2d(:,4)));
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270 sda 2d(kk,1) = (sum(wi 2d(:,3).*wi 2d(:,5)) + sum(trades 2d(:,7)))/(sum...
(wi 2d(:,3)) + sum(trades 2d(:,5)) - sum(trades 2d(:,4)));
271 end
272 toc
273
274 %Trading, 1d
275 tic
276 vol 1d = zeros(steps ret,2); %volume of acres bought, volume of acres sold
277 acr 1d = zeros(steps ret,1); %acres retired
278 Esdr 1d = zeros(steps ret,1); %expected stream depletion reduction (SDF * ...
area)
279 Asdr 1d = zeros(steps ret,1); %actual stream depletion reduction (SD/ac * ...
area)
280 dyd 1d = zeros(steps ret,1); %total decrease of yield (bu/ac * ac)
281 wat 1d = zeros(steps ret,1);
282 sda 1d = zeros(steps ret,1);
283
284 for kk = 1:steps ret
285 ret 1d = [YI(:,1:2), perc ret(kk)*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
286 wi 1d = [YI(:,1:2), (1 - perc ret(kk))*YI(:,3), YI(:,4), YI(:,7)];
287 wo 1d = [YD; ret 1d];
288
289 fields irr = size(wi 1d,1);
290 fields dry = size(wo 1d,1);
291
292 %Preallocate and find effective bid
293 eff bid 1d = zeros(fields irr,fields dry); %effective bid between ...
each buyer and seller, weighted by SDF
294 bid type = zeros(fields irr,fields dry); %zero for 1:1 trade, 1 if...
discounted
295
296 for i = 1:fields irr %sellers
297 for j = 1:fields dry %buyers
298 if wo 1d(j,3) > 0
299 %if there is positive acreage, there is a demand to buy.
300 %otherwise, eff bid = 0.
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301 if wi 1d(i,2) ≥ wo 1d(j,2)
302 %SDF of seller is less than SDF of buyer, 1:1 trade
303 eff bid 1d(i,j) = max(0, wo 1d(j,1) - wi 1d(i,1));
304 else
305 bid type(i,j) = 1;
306 eff bid 1d(i,j) = max(wo 1d(j,1) - wi 1d(i,1)*wo 1d(j...
,2)/wi 1d(i,2),0);
307 %related by y = mx + b, where m is the seller's sdf/yd,...
b is the
308 %y-intercept for the buyer using that seller's sdf/yd. ...
then set y =
309 %0 and solve for x, the effective bid.
310 end
311 end
312 end
313 end
314
315 [ranked 1d index 1d] = sortrows(reshape(eff bid 1d,[],1),-1);
316 %properties of trades
317 %(1) total increase in yields
318 %(2) expected change in SD
319 %(3) actual change in SD
320 %(4) acres sold
321 %(5) acres bought
322 trades 1d = zeros(size(index 1d,1),7);
323
324 %tracks acreage
325 purch 1d = zeros(fields dry,1);
326 sold 1d = zeros(fields irr,1);
327
328 for i = 1:length(index 1d)
329 if ranked 1d(i) > 0
330 buyer index = ceil(index 1d(i)/fields irr);
331 seller index = 1 + rem(index 1d(i) + fields irr - 1, fields irr...
);
332 if bid type(index 1d(i)) == 0
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333 %seller's constraint
334 S con 1d = (wi 1d(seller index,3)-sold 1d(seller index,1));
335 %buyer's constraint
336 B con 1d = (wo 1d(buyer index,3)-purch 1d(buyer index,1));
337 const 1d = min([S con 1d B con 1d]);
338 trades 1d(i,4) = const 1d;
339 trades 1d(i,5) = const 1d;
340 else
341 %seller's constraint
342 S con 1d = (wi 1d(seller index,3)-sold 1d(seller index,1))*...
wi 1d(seller index,2);
343 %buyer's constraint
344 B con 1d = (wo 1d(buyer index,3)-purch 1d(buyer index,1))*...
wo 1d(buyer index,2);
345 %trade max acres between constraints
346 [const 1d IX] = min([S con 1d B con 1d]);
347 if IX == 1
348 %S con binds
349 trades 1d(i,4) = wi 1d(seller index,3)-sold 1d(...
seller index,1);
350 trades 1d(i,5) = const 1d/wo 1d(buyer index,2);
351 else
352 %B con binds
353 trades 1d(i,4) = const 1d/wi 1d(seller index,2);
354 trades 1d(i,5) = wo 1d(buyer index,3)-purch 1d(...
buyer index,1);
355 end
356 end
357 trades 1d(i,6) = wo 1d(buyer index,4)*trades 1d(i,5) - wi 1d(...
seller index,4)*trades 1d(i,4);
358 trades 1d(i,7) = wo 1d(buyer index,5)*trades 1d(i,5) - wi 1d(...
seller index,5)*trades 1d(i,4);
359 trades 1d(i,1) = wo 1d(buyer index,1)*trades 1d(i,5) - wi 1d(...
seller index,1)*trades 1d(i,4);
360 trades 1d(i,2) = wo 1d(buyer index,2)*trades 1d(i,5) - wi 1d(...
seller index,2)*trades 1d(i,4);
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361 trades 1d(i,3) = wo 1d(buyer index,5)*trades 1d(i,5) - wi 1d(...
seller index,5)*trades 1d(i,4);
362 %update buyer
363 purch 1d(buyer index,1) = purch 1d(buyer index,1) + trades 1d(i...
,5);
364 %update seller
365 sold 1d(seller index,1) = sold 1d(seller index,1) + trades 1d(i...
,4);
366 end
367 end
368 %for final output
369 acr 1d(kk,1) = sum(ret 1d(:,3));
370 dyd 1d(kk,1) = sum(ret 1d(:,1).*ret 1d(:,3)) - sum(trades 1d(:,1));
371 Esdr 1d(kk,1) = wtd pump*(sum(ret 1d(:,2).*ret 1d(:,3)) - sum(trades 1d...
(:,2)));
372 Asdr 1d(kk,1) = sum(ret 1d(:,5).*ret 1d(:,3)) - sum(trades 1d(:,3));
373 vol 1d(kk,1:2) = sum(trades 1d(:,4:5));
374 wat 1d(kk,1) = (sum(wi 1d(:,3).*wi 1d(:,4)) + sum(trades 1d(:,6)))/(sum...
(wi 1d(:,3)) + sum(trades 1d(:,5)) - sum(trades 1d(:,4)));
375 sda 1d(kk,1) = (sum(wi 1d(:,3).*wi 1d(:,5)) + sum(trades 1d(:,7)))/(sum...
(wi 1d(:,3)) + sum(trades 1d(:,5)) - sum(trades 1d(:,4)));
376 end
377 toc
378
379 %%%%%%%%%%%
380 % FIGURES %
381 %%%%%%%%%%%
382 %set(0,'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[0 0 0],'DefaultAxesLineStyleOrder...
','-|--|:|-.')
383 set(0,'DefaultAxesLineStyleOrder','-|--|-.')
384 set(0,'DefaultAxesColorOrder',[0 0 0])
385
386 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
387 % Dryland/ irrigated properties %
388 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
389 formspec1 = 'TPNRD properties';
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390 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec1);
391 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], 'Visible', ...
'off');
392 subplot(1,2,1);
393 %h4 = plot(YI(:,1),100*YI(:,2),YI(:,3)/50,'ok','LineWidth',2);
394 %set (h4,'FontSize',20)
395 h4 = scatter(YI(:,1),100*YI(:,2),YI(:,3)/50,'k','LineWidth',2);
396 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
397 %axis([250 450 0 16])
398 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Stream depletion factor (%)')
399 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Profitability of irrigation ($/ac)')
400 title('\fontsize{28} Irrigated Fields')
401 subplot(1,2,2)
402 h5 = scatter(XR(:,1),100*XR(:,2),XR(:,3)/50,'k','LineWidth',2);
403 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
404 %axis([250 450 0 16])
405 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Stream depletion factor (%)')
406 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Profitability of irrigation ($/ac)')
407 title('\fontsize{28} Dryland Fields')
408 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
409
410 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
411 % Policy analysis %
412 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
413 formspec1 = 'TPNRD micro';
414 fnam1 = sprintf(formspec1);
415 h1 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], 'Visible', ...
'off');
416 r1 = plot(T ret(1:4:end,2)/12,T ret(1:4:end,1)/(10ˆ6),'--x',S ret(:,2)/12,...
S ret(:,1)/(10ˆ6),':',Z ret(1:6:end,2)/12,Z ret(1:6:end,1)/(10ˆ6),'--o'...
,P ret(:,2)/12,P ret(:,1)/(10ˆ6),'-',Asdr 11(1:4:end,:)/12,dyd 11(1:4...
:end,:)/(10ˆ6),'-.s',Asdr 1d/12,dyd 1d/(10ˆ6),'-.',Asdr 2d/12,dyd 2d...
/(10ˆ6),'--');
417 r2 = legend('Land tax','SDF tax','Zoning','Depletion tax','Trading, one-to-...
one','Trading, unidirectional','Trading, bidirectional','Location','...
Northwest');
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418 set(r1,'LineWidth',2)
419 set(r2,'FontSize',16)
420 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
421 xlim([0 (4.6*10ˆ4)])
422 title({'\fontsize{28} Comparison of Policies to Increase Streamflow'})
423 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Total increase in streamflow (ac-ft)') %...
abatement
424 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Total reduction of profits ($M)')
425 print(h1,fnam1,'-depsc')
426
427 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
428 % Irrigated land and streamflow %
429 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
430 formspec3 = 'TPNRD area';
431 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec3);
432 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], 'Visible', ...
'off');
433 r1 = plot(T ret(1:4:end,3),T ret(1:4:end,2)/12,'--x',S ret(:,3),S ret(:,2)...
/12,':',Z ret(1:4:end,3),Z ret(1:4:end,2)/12,'--o',P ret(:,3),P ret...
(:,2)/12,'-',acr 11(1:4:end,:),Asdr 11(1:4:end,:)/12,'-.s',acr 1d,...
Asdr 1d/12,'-.',acr 2d,Asdr 2d/12,'--');
434 r2 = legend('Land tax','SDF tax','Zoning','Depletion tax','Trading, one-to-...
one','Trading, unidirectional','Trading, bidirectional','Location','...
Northwest');
435 set(r1,'LineWidth',2)
436 set(r2,'FontSize',16)
437 set(gca,'FontSize',20)
438 title({'\fontsize{28} Reduction of Stream Depletion with Area'})
439 xlabel('\fontsize{24} Total reduction of irrigated land (ac)') %permits ...
retired
440 ylabel('\fontsize{24} Total increase in streamflow (ac-ft)') %...
abatement
441 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
442
443 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
444 % Average water usage changes %
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445 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
446 formspec1 = 'TPNRD water4';
447 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec1);
448 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], 'Visible', ...
'off');
449 r1 = plot(T ret(:,2)/12,T ret(:,5),W ret(:,2)/12,W ret(:,5),S ret(:,2)/12,...
S ret(:,5),P ret(:,2)/12,P ret(:,5),Z ret(:,2)/12,Z ret(:,5),Asdr 11...
/12,wat 11,'--',Asdr 2d/12,wat 2d,'--',Asdr 1d/12,wat 1d,'--'); %...
abatement vs avg water usage
450 axis([0 total sd/12 14.5 16])
451 ylabel('\fontsize{16} Average water usage (in)')
452 xlabel('\fontsize{16} Total increase in streamflow (ac-ft)')
453 title('\fontsize{20} Resulting Changes in Water Usage')
454 r2 = legend('Land tax','Water tax','SDF tax','Pigouvian tax','Zoning','...
Trading, 1:1','Trading, bidirectional','Trading, unidirectional','...
Location','Northwest');
455 set(r1,'LineWidth',1)
456 set(r2,'FontSize',14)
457 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
458
459 formspec1 = 'TPNRD watland4';
460 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec1);
461 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], 'Visible', ...
'off');
462 r1 = plot(T ret(:,3),T ret(:,5),W ret(:,3),W ret(:,5),S ret(:,3),S ret(:,5)...
,P ret(:,3),P ret(:,5),Z ret(:,3),Z ret(:,5),acr 11,wat 11,'--',acr 2d,...
wat 2d,'--',acr 1d,wat 1d,'--'); %abatement vs avg water usage
463 axis([0 total acres 14.5 16])
464 ylabel('\fontsize{16} Average water usage (in)')
465 xlabel('\fontsize{16} Total reduction of irrigated land (ac)')
466 title('\fontsize{20} Resulting Changes in Water Usage')
467 r2 = legend('Land tax','Water tax','SDF tax','Pigouvian tax','Zoning','...
Trading, 1:1','Trading, bidirectional','Trading, unidirectional','...
Location','Northwest');
468 set(r1,'LineWidth',1)
469 set(r2,'FontSize',14)
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470 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
471
472
473 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
474 % Average stream depletion changes %
475 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
476 formspec1 = 'TPNRD sdac4';
477 fnam3 = sprintf(formspec1);
478 h3 = figure('PaperUnits','inches','PaperPosition',[.5 .5 12 8], 'Visible', ...
'off');
479 r1 = plot(T ret(:,2)/12,T ret(:,6),W ret(:,2)/12,W ret(:,6),S ret(:,2)/12,...
S ret(:,6),P ret(:,2)/12,P ret(:,6),Z ret(:,2)/12,Z ret(:,6),Asdr 11...
/12,sda 11,'--',Asdr 2d/12,sda 2d,'--',Asdr 1d/12,sda 1d,'--'); %...
abatement vs avg water usage
480 ylim([0 9])
481 xlim([0 4.5*10ˆ4])
482 ylabel('\fontsize{16} Average stream depletion per acre (ac-in/ac)')
483 xlabel('\fontsize{16} Total increase in streamflow (ac-ft)')
484 title('\fontsize{20} Resulting Changes in Water Usage')
485 r2 = legend('Land tax','Water tax','SDF tax','Pigouvian tax','Zoning','...
Trading, 1:1','Trading, bidirectional','Trading, unidirectional','...
Location','Northeast');
486 set(r1,'LineWidth',1)
487 set(r2,'FontSize',14)
488 print(h3,fnam3,'-depsc')
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